Second adversarial review pass, this time over the expansion modules
(comments, webhooks, search, resolution, SDK). 9 findings, all verified real,
zero false positives:
- CRITICAL SSRF: the webhook dispatcher POSTed to any user-supplied URL,
letting an authed caller hit cloud-metadata (169.254.169.254) and internal
hosts, and use delivery outcome as a port-scan side channel. Added
src/webhooks/ssrf.ts (blocks loopback/link-local/RFC-1918/metadata for IPv4,
IPv6, and mapped forms) wired into webhook creation; residual DNS-rebinding
risk documented.
- HIGH: new webhooks received events that predated their subscription (global
high-water mark). Added per-subscription start_event_id with migration.
- HIGH: ResolutionSweeper had no concurrent-tick guard → duplicate AI calls
when the provider is slow. Added the running-flag guard.
- MEDIUM: webhook-create rate limit (10/hr), atomic dispatcher writes,
resolution force-flag body parsing without Content-Type; LOW: x402 signer
browser base64 via TextEncoder.
tsc clean; 288 -> 294 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>