Closes docs/THREAT-MODEL.md's "A compromised audit-log" Repudiation
gap (item 9's precise TODO): VerifyChain was only exposed as
audit-log's own RPC, so a compromised audit-log process could simply
lie about its own integrity. internal/store.VerifyFile re-derives the
hash chain directly from the on-disk audit.log file, opened strictly
read-only (O_RDONLY, never O_RDWR), with no Store/gRPC involvement —
the same per-record checks replay()/VerifyChain() already perform, but
reporting every failure (corrupt record, broken chain, non-contiguous
sequence) as a result rather than requiring a live, trusted process to
ask.
services/audit-log/cmd/verify-chain wraps it as an operator-run CLI
(`verify-chain [path]`, defaulting to
$RATION_AUDIT_LOG_DATA_DIR/audit.log) that dials nothing and exits
nonzero on any break or unreadable file — safe to wire into a health
check or an out-of-band cron, independent of whether the audit-log
binary itself would lie about VerifyChain's RPC result.
Manually verified end-to-end against a real generated audit.log:
intact chain exits 0, a payload_json edit without hash recomputation
is detected and exits 1 with the exact broken sequence. RED->GREEN
with new store/cmd test suites; added to `make build-go`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 section 7 (the other half, alongside sdk/go/ration and
sdk/rust/ration-client already pushed in c5297e4/8215fb8): a hand-rolled
internal/httpapi on services/gateway translating JSON <-> the gRPC source
of truth (cards, deposits, bridge funding, activity), documented as a
convenience facade over gRPC, not a parallel implementation. Also folds in
the remaining phase-2 doc updates (ARCHITECTURE/RUNBOOK/THREAT-MODEL/
AIRWALLEX-SETUP/SUBMISSION, ADR 0003/0004) and docker-compose/Makefile/
.env.example wiring from the resumed phase-2 workflow's final agents.
Verified: go build/vet/test clean across all 10 services + both new SDKs,
`make build && make test` clean end to end (C WAL, Rust ledger-core + the
new Rust SDK, every Go module including sdk/go/ration).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 service decomposition per docs/SCALE-EXPANSION.md section 1: extracts
internal/{airwallex,bridge,card,tenant,httpserver} out of the monolithic
gateway into four independently deployable gRPC services (each own go.mod,
Dockerfile, and tests), with gateway now a thin BFF that fans out through new
cardissuanceclient/webhookeventsclient gRPC clients. gateway.proto's external
surface is unchanged — agent/tui/cli still talk to gateway exactly as before.
Verified: all 10 go.work modules build and `go test ./...` passes across
every one, including the new gateway client packages against the live split
services (via `make build && make test`).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Six services, independently built then integrated:
- services/wal (C): crash-safe write-ahead log, CRC32-checksummed
frames, torn-write recovery via truncate-to-last-valid-frame.
- services/ledger-core (Rust): double-entry ledger over the C WAL via
FFI, reserve-floor enforcement BEFORE any WAL write, idempotent
ApplyEntry, full LedgerCore gRPC service.
- services/gateway (Go): Airwallex Issuing/Global-Accounts client
(mock mode default, live mode ready), the actual rationing math
(reserve floor, 60% bridge cap, 24h velocity cap, partial-over-decline).
- services/agent (Go): deterministic hard-rule policy envelope computed
BEFORE any LLM call; Claude only decides within that pre-approved
envelope; every decision audit-logged even when the LLM call fails.
- services/tui (Go, Bubble Tea) + services/cli (Go, cobra): the only
UI — no web frontend, per explicit direction.
Integration found and fixed three real bugs, not just compile errors:
- proto regen collision shadowing checked-in pkg/pb packages
- ledger-core/gateway address-variable mismatch (stack would never
actually connect on default config)
- the big one: MarkDepositReceived never credited the ledger, so every
tenant's balance was permanently stuck at 0 and bridge-funding could
only ever decline — the core agentic-rationing feature could never
produce a real grant. Fixed at the ledger level with idempotent
mark-and-credit in one WAL frame, covered by 3 new tests.
End-to-end verified live, reproducibly: seed -> simulate a late deposit
-> agent grants a partial bridge with a computed rationale -> second
grant correctly declines once the 24h velocity cap engages. Verified
independently by the orchestrator too: 'make build' and 'make test'
both clean (Rust: 29 tests; Go: all packages; C: WAL test suite).
Airwallex sandbox credentials still pending organizer approval —
tracked as an owner blocker in docs/AIRWALLEX-SETUP.md, not a code gap.