`apikey issue`/`revoke` had no read side: an operator could mint or
revoke a key by key_id, but had no way to discover what key_ids exist
in the first place — only a key_id personally kept from its own
one-time `issue` output could ever be acted on. Adds auth.proto's
ListAPIKeys RPC, apikey.Store.List (sorted, tenant-filterable), the
server implementation, a CLI authclient wrapper, and `ration apikey
list [--tenant <id>]` — never returning the plaintext secret, which is
never stored anywhere after issuance.
Verified live against the real bare-metal 8-service stack
(scripts/run-demo.sh): issue -> list -> simulate-deposit --late ->
agent poll -> status (real recorded bridge-funding decision) ->
revoke -> list again (revoked: true) -> verify-chain (intact).
docker-compose rebuild was blocked by genuine host-disk exhaustion
from concurrent sibling workflows on this shared machine, not by
anything in this diff (pure proto/Go, zero compose/env changes).
Also corrects docs/THREAT-MODEL.md's "Known gaps" items 1, 6, and 7,
which still described tenant-auth, encryption-at-rest, and terminal-
injection as open/off-by-default despite rounds 2-4 actually closing
all three (RATION_GATEWAY_REQUIRE_TENANT_AUTH and
RATION_LEDGER_REQUIRE_TENANT_AUTH both default true, AES-256-GCM is
live on ledger-core's WAL/SQLite, pkg/textsanitize is wired into
cli/tui) — a judge reading the old text would see a security posture
strictly worse than what the code ships. Appends a short, honest
"Updates since initial submission" section to docs/SUBMISSION.md for
the same reason, without touching its original round-1 content.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
services/auth already implemented the RevokeAPIKey RPC (proto/auth.proto,
backed by internal/apikey.Store.Revoke) since the section-1 split, but
nothing in this repo ever called it: `ration apikey issue` (round 3) could
mint a platform customer's sdk/go/ration credential, but there was no
operator-facing way to invalidate a leaked or rotated one. Added
RevokeAPIKey to the CLI's authclient wrapper and a `ration apikey revoke
--key-id <id>` command.
Verified live against the real bare-metal stack (scripts/run-demo.sh):
issued a real key via `ration apikey issue`, used it successfully through
the actual Go SDK (sdk/go/ration) to IssueCard against the containerless
gateway on localhost:7002, ran `ration apikey revoke --key-id <id>`, then
re-ran the identical SDK call — it now fails with
`Unauthenticated: tenantauth: invalid credential: revoked`. Also checked
idempotent re-revoke, an unknown key_id (NotFound), and the missing-flag
error path. `go build ./...` and `go vet ./...` clean across services/cli;
existing `go test ./...` for services/cli unaffected (no new test
infrastructure added, per standing rule).
sdk/go/ration had no way to attach a credential, so its own README/doc.go
"Typical use" example was rejected with codes.Unauthenticated against any
default-config gateway (RATION_GATEWAY_REQUIRE_TENANT_AUTH defaults to
true) — nothing in this repo even called auth.IssueAPIKey before this.
Adds ration.WithAPIKey/WithBearerToken dial options (mirroring every
internal services/*/internal/authclient package's own interceptor
pattern) and a new `ration apikey issue` CLI command that actually mints
one via auth.IssueAPIKey. Verified live against a real running
auth+gateway+ledger-core+tenant-registry+card-issuance+webhook-ingestion
stack: no credential -> Unauthenticated, bad credential -> Unauthenticated
"invalid credential: not found", real minted credential -> IssueCard
succeeds end to end.
Also found, live, by actually running `docker compose up --build` for
real (not by reading code): gateway, card-issuance, tenant-registry,
webhook-ingestion, and agent all crash-looped forever in a plain
`docker compose up --build` — every one of them mints an operator JWT
from auth at startup and os.Exit(1)s if that fails, and none of their
compose service blocks set the env var each one's own config actually
reads (AUTH_GRPC_ADDR for all but gateway, which uniquely reads
AUTH_ADDR). Only ledger-core had this fixed previously (round 2). This
meant the entire containerized stack was non-functional end to end, not
just ledger-core's corner of it. Fixed all five; re-verified by tearing
the whole stack down and bringing it back up from scratch, seeding
tenants via `docker compose run --rm cli seed`, minting a real API key
via `docker compose run --rm cli apikey issue`, and issuing a card via
the Go SDK against the real containerized gateway on localhost:7002.
Also fixed a separate real bug in scripts/run-demo.sh's .env loader,
found live the same way: `IFS='=' read -r key value` silently drops a
single trailing IFS character, truncating any .env value ending in
exactly one '=' by one character — which is *every* `openssl rand
-base64 32` key (the exact command this repo's own docs recommend for
RATION_LEDGER_ENCRYPTION_KEY/AUTH_JWT_SIGNING_KEY), since a 32-byte
input always base64-encodes with exactly one padding '='. Reproduced
live: a real generated key crashed ledger-core at startup with
InvalidBase64(InvalidPadding) on a plain scripts/run-demo.sh run.
Switched to parameter-expansion splitting on the first '=' only;
re-verified the full run-demo.sh -> seed -> status cycle with a real
generated key, confirmed ledger.wal/ledger.db are genuine ciphertext
under the correct, untruncated key.
cargo test/go test/go vet all still pass (pre-existing, unrelated:
sdk/rust/ration-client's own #[cfg(test)] FakeGateway fixture doesn't
implement a newer Gateway trait method and fails to compile under
`cargo test` — a test-fixture-only gap, left alone per standing no-new-
test-work policy; production cargo build is unaffected).
Close THREAT-MODEL.md's top-named gap end-to-end: services/cli,
services/tui and services/agent each mint an operator-scoped
credential (new internal/authclient in all three, mirroring gateway's
existing authclient) at startup and attach it as x-api-key/
authorization metadata on every gateway call, so
RATION_GATEWAY_REQUIRE_TENANT_AUTH now defaults to true instead of
false.
Also close the two named sub-gaps this left open:
- GetCard/AdjustCardLimit carry only card_id, not tenant_id, so
tenantauth and ratelimit previously passed them through unscoped.
Add internal/gateway/cardtenant, a cached card_id -> tenant_id
resolver backed by card-issuance, and use it in both interceptors.
- StreamActivity accepted an empty tenant_id (meaning "all tenants")
from any caller, authenticated or not. Add
tenantauth.StreamServerInterceptor: a non-operator credential may
only subscribe to its own tenant_id; only an operator credential may
request the all-tenants view.