docs/THREAT-MODEL.md states plainly: "The TUI does not currently display rationale/agent decisions at all — only tenants, deposits, cards, and the live activity stream." Add a 5th tab (new view/decisions.go, wired into model.go/state.go's tab state) that fetches every tenant's ListAgentDecisions each refresh, sorted newest first across tenants, and renders WHEN/TENANT/TRIGGER/ACTION/ RATIONALE/POLICY SNAPSHOT. Extract the CLI's existing sanitizeControlChars into pkg/textsanitize and apply it (via the new format.SanitizedCell, sanitize-then-truncate) to every LLM-authored field this new tab renders, closing the same terminal-escape-sequence injection gap for this surface at the same time it's built, not after.
46 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
46 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
// Package textsanitize strips terminal-escape-sequence injection risk
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// out of free text before it is ever written to an operator's
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// terminal.
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//
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// The risk this closes is documented in docs/THREAT-MODEL.md: LLM-
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// authored, attacker-influenceable text (an agent decision's
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// Rationale/Trigger, ultimately derived from a trigger->prompt->
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// rationale chain an adversarial deposit/webhook payload could steer)
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// is printed verbatim in more than one place now — the CLI's `status`
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// command, and services/tui's "Agent Decisions" tab. A sufficiently
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// adversarial chain could, in principle, inject ANSI/VT100 escape
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// sequences (cursor manipulation, hidden text, even OSC 8 hyperlink or
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// terminal-title tricks) into whichever terminal eventually renders it.
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//
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// Originally lived only in services/cli/cmd/ration/status.go
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// (sanitizeControlChars); extracted here so every new surface that
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// renders this same LLM-authored text — starting with the TUI's
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// decisions tab — gets the identical protection applied before
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// rendering, not bolted on after the fact.
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package textsanitize
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import (
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"strings"
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"unicode"
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)
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// StripControlChars removes C0 and C1 control characters (including
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// ESC, so no ANSI/VT100 escape sequence can survive) from s.
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//
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// Ordinary whitespace (tab, newline, carriage return) is preserved
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// since typical terminal rendering (a tabwriter, a line-wrapped
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// textarea) relies on it for layout; every other control character
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// (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F, and the UTF-8-encoded C1 range U+0080-U+009F) is
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// dropped.
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func StripControlChars(s string) string {
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return strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
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if r == '\t' || r == '\n' || r == '\r' {
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return r
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}
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if unicode.IsControl(r) {
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return -1
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}
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return r
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}, s)
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}
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