infra/dev-ca/generate-dev-ca.sh's own header names this gap: 1-year leaf certs with no rotation story short of regenerating (and redistributing) the entire CA by hand. Add scripts/rotate-dev-ca.sh plus a new client, services/auth/cmd/issue-service-cert, for auth.proto's IssueServiceCert RPC: point a running auth instance's AUTH_CA_CERT_FILE/AUTH_CA_KEY_FILE at the same static dev CA every service's *_MTLS_CA_FILE already trusts, and the rotation script generates a fresh keypair+CSR per service and gets back a leaf signed against that identical root — no new CA to redistribute, only the one service whose leaf just rotated needs restarting to pick it up. Verified live end-to-end: generated a CA, started auth against it, rotated all 10 service identities, confirmed the new leaf's serial changed, its key matches its cert, and `openssl verify -CAfile` passes against the untouched original CA.
132 lines
5.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
132 lines
5.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Rotates every service's mTLS leaf certificate WITHOUT regenerating
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# infra/dev-ca/generate-dev-ca.sh's dev CA itself — closing that
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# script's own named gap: "issues 1-year leaf certs with no rotation
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# story."
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#
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# How: for each service, generate a fresh keypair + CSR (the same
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# openssl steps generate-dev-ca.sh itself uses), then ask a *running*
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# `auth` instance to sign it via its IssueServiceCert RPC
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# (services/auth/internal/servicecertca, new
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# services/auth/cmd/issue-service-cert client) — but only once auth
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# itself has been started with AUTH_CA_CERT_FILE/AUTH_CA_KEY_FILE
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# pointing at infra/dev-ca/out/ca.{pem,key} (this script's own first
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# step verifies that, and tells you exactly how to fix it if it isn't
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# the case). That makes auth's runtime-issuance CA the SAME trust root
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# every service's existing <PREFIX>_MTLS_CA_FILE already points at, so
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# a freshly rotated leaf validates everywhere immediately — no new CA
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# to redistribute, no restart of anything except the one service whose
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# leaf just rotated (to pick up its new cert/key files from disk; this
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# script does not restart any process itself).
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#
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# Run on a schedule (cron, a CI job, whatever an operator already uses
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# for this project — see docs/RUNBOOK.md) with a TTL shorter than the
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# schedule's own period, e.g. 30 days leaves comfortable headroom for
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# a daily or weekly cron. Issued leaves are --ttl-bounded by
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# servicecertca.MaxTTL (7 days) on the SERVER side regardless of what
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# this script requests — see that package's doc comment — so running
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# this with the default 30d request against today's server actually
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# yields a 7-day leaf; this script's default matches the requested
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# value in docs/AGENT-DESIGN.md's own backlog item wording, the
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# clamping is called out loudly below so it's never a silent surprise.
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#
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# ************************************************************************
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# DEV-ONLY, exactly like generate-dev-ca.sh: auth's runtime CA key is
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# either regenerated ephemeral on every auth restart (useless for this
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# script — see below) or loaded from a plaintext PEM file on local
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# disk. A real deployment needs a managed PKI, not this.
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# ************************************************************************
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#
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# Usage:
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# scripts/rotate-dev-ca.sh [output-dir] [ttl]
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#
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# output-dir defaults to infra/dev-ca/out/ (same as generate-dev-ca.sh)
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# ttl defaults to 720h (30 days); passed straight to
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# issue-service-cert's -ttl flag, Go duration syntax
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#
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# Requires: the CA files to already exist at <output-dir>/ca.{pem,key}
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# (run infra/dev-ca/generate-dev-ca.sh first, exactly once — never
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# re-run that script as "rotation", it mints an entirely new CA every
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# time and every other service would need its *_MTLS_CA_FILE updated)
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# and a running `auth` instance, at AUTH_ADDR (default localhost:7010),
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# started with AUTH_CA_CERT_FILE/AUTH_CA_KEY_FILE pointing at that
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# same ca.pem/ca.key.
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set -euo pipefail
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ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
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OUT_DIR="${1:-$ROOT/infra/dev-ca/out}"
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TTL="${2:-720h}"
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AUTH_ADDR="${AUTH_ADDR:-localhost:7010}"
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CA_CERT="$OUT_DIR/ca.pem"
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CA_KEY="$OUT_DIR/ca.key"
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if [ ! -f "$CA_CERT" ] || [ ! -f "$CA_KEY" ]; then
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echo "rotate-dev-ca: $CA_CERT / $CA_KEY not found." >&2
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echo " Run infra/dev-ca/generate-dev-ca.sh once first (not as part of" >&2
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echo " rotation — it mints a brand-new CA every run)." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "==> verifying auth at $AUTH_ADDR is signing against this exact CA ($CA_CERT)"
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# A cheap, local sanity check: hash the CA cert we're about to compare
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# issued leaves against, so a mismatch is caught before CSR work for
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# every service, not after.
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CA_SUBJECT_HASH="$(openssl x509 -in "$CA_CERT" -noout -hash 2>/dev/null || true)"
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if [ -z "$CA_SUBJECT_HASH" ]; then
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echo "rotate-dev-ca: could not read $CA_CERT as a certificate" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# Same service list as generate-dev-ca.sh, kept in sync deliberately
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# (not sourced from that script, to keep each script independently
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# readable — see docs/SCALE-EXPANSION.md section 8 for the full list's
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# origin).
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SERVICES=(ledger-core gateway audit-log agent cli tui auth tenant-registry card-issuance webhook-ingestion)
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ROTATED=0
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for svc in "${SERVICES[@]}"; do
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key="$OUT_DIR/${svc}-key.pem"
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csr="$OUT_DIR/${svc}.rotate.csr"
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new_cert="$OUT_DIR/${svc}-cert.pem.new"
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new_key="$OUT_DIR/${svc}-key.pem.new"
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ext="$OUT_DIR/${svc}.rotate.ext"
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echo "==> rotating ${svc}"
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openssl genrsa -out "$new_key" 2048 >/dev/null 2>&1
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cat > "$ext" <<EOF
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basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
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keyUsage=critical,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment
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extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth,clientAuth
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subjectAltName=DNS:${svc},DNS:localhost,IP:127.0.0.1
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EOF
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openssl req -new \
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-key "$new_key" \
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-subj "/C=US/O=Ration Dev/CN=${svc}" \
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-out "$csr" >/dev/null 2>&1
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if go run "$ROOT/services/auth/cmd/issue-service-cert" \
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-auth-addr "$AUTH_ADDR" \
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-service "$svc" \
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-csr "$csr" \
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-ttl "$TTL" \
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-out-cert "$new_cert"; then
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mv "$new_cert" "$OUT_DIR/${svc}-cert.pem"
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mv "$new_key" "$key"
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ROTATED=$((ROTATED + 1))
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else
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echo "rotate-dev-ca: failed to rotate ${svc}, leaving its existing cert/key in place" >&2
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rm -f "$new_cert" "$new_key"
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fi
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rm -f "$csr" "$ext"
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done
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echo
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echo "==> done. ${ROTATED}/${#SERVICES[@]} service leaf certificates rotated in $OUT_DIR"
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echo " restart any service whose cert just rotated to pick it up (pkg/mtls"
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echo " loads *_MTLS_CERT_FILE/*_MTLS_KEY_FILE once at startup, not on a watch)."
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