infra/dev-ca/generate-dev-ca.sh's own header names this gap: 1-year
leaf certs with no rotation story short of regenerating (and
redistributing) the entire CA by hand.
Add scripts/rotate-dev-ca.sh plus a new client,
services/auth/cmd/issue-service-cert, for auth.proto's IssueServiceCert
RPC: point a running auth instance's AUTH_CA_CERT_FILE/AUTH_CA_KEY_FILE
at the same static dev CA every service's *_MTLS_CA_FILE already
trusts, and the rotation script generates a fresh keypair+CSR per
service and gets back a leaf signed against that identical root — no
new CA to redistribute, only the one service whose leaf just rotated
needs restarting to pick it up.
Verified live end-to-end: generated a CA, started auth against it,
rotated all 10 service identities, confirmed the new leaf's serial
changed, its key matches its cert, and `openssl verify -CAfile` passes
against the untouched original CA.