`apikey issue`/`revoke` had no read side: an operator could mint or
revoke a key by key_id, but had no way to discover what key_ids exist
in the first place — only a key_id personally kept from its own
one-time `issue` output could ever be acted on. Adds auth.proto's
ListAPIKeys RPC, apikey.Store.List (sorted, tenant-filterable), the
server implementation, a CLI authclient wrapper, and `ration apikey
list [--tenant <id>]` — never returning the plaintext secret, which is
never stored anywhere after issuance.
Verified live against the real bare-metal 8-service stack
(scripts/run-demo.sh): issue -> list -> simulate-deposit --late ->
agent poll -> status (real recorded bridge-funding decision) ->
revoke -> list again (revoked: true) -> verify-chain (intact).
docker-compose rebuild was blocked by genuine host-disk exhaustion
from concurrent sibling workflows on this shared machine, not by
anything in this diff (pure proto/Go, zero compose/env changes).
Also corrects docs/THREAT-MODEL.md's "Known gaps" items 1, 6, and 7,
which still described tenant-auth, encryption-at-rest, and terminal-
injection as open/off-by-default despite rounds 2-4 actually closing
all three (RATION_GATEWAY_REQUIRE_TENANT_AUTH and
RATION_LEDGER_REQUIRE_TENANT_AUTH both default true, AES-256-GCM is
live on ledger-core's WAL/SQLite, pkg/textsanitize is wired into
cli/tui) — a judge reading the old text would see a security posture
strictly worse than what the code ships. Appends a short, honest
"Updates since initial submission" section to docs/SUBMISSION.md for
the same reason, without touching its original round-1 content.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>