docs/THREAT-MODEL.md names this "the biggest one" sub-gap of item 1:
cli/tui/agent (and gateway's own forwarding, card-issuance,
webhook-ingestion, tenant-registry) all dial ledger-core directly,
bypassing gateway's internal/tenantauth entirely, so any operator or
compromised caller could act as any tenant_id against the system's
actual source of truth regardless of what gateway enforces upstream.
Add services/ledger-core/src/tenantauth.rs (authorize_tenant /
authorize_operator, checking x-api-key / authorization: Bearer headers
against a new src/authclient.rs that dials Auth's VerifyAPIKey/
VerifyJWT directly) and call it from every LedgerCore RPC handler.
RATION_LEDGER_REQUIRE_TENANT_AUTH defaults to true; ledger-core refuses
to start with it on but no AUTH_GRPC_ADDR configured.
Every direct ledger-core caller now mints and presents its own
operator-scoped credential: cli/tui/agent (reusing their existing
gateway credential), and new internal/authclient packages for gateway,
card-issuance, webhook-ingestion and tenant-registry.
Verified end-to-end against the live demo stack (seed, simulate-deposit,
status, and the agent's poll/bridge-funding loop all succeed with the
new enforcement on; zero Unauthenticated/PermissionDenied anywhere in
any service's logs).