CardholderName is operator-authored free text (ration card issue --cardholder, and the TUI's own issue-card form) — the same class of terminal-escape-injection risk already closed for Trigger/Rationale/ PolicySnapshotJson. card.go's printCard (card issue/get/adjust-limit/ close) already sanitized it, but status.go's printCards (used by both `ration status` and `ration card list`) printed it raw, and the TUI's Cards tab table (view/cards.go) and the adjust-limit modal's infoLine (model/cardform.go) did too. A cardholder name containing an ANSI escape sequence would inject into `ration status` output — the single most commonly run command in this whole repo's demo flow — and into the TUI dashboard a judge/operator is meant to watch live. Fixed all three raw render sites to go through the same sanitizeControlChars/format.SanitizedCell/textsanitize.StripControlChars helpers already used everywhere else free text is displayed. Verified live against the real bare-metal 8-service stack: issued a card with a cardholder name containing a real ESC (0x1b) byte + "[31;1mINJECTED[0m", confirmed `ration status` and `ration card list` output now contain zero raw ESC bytes (byte-counted, not just visual), and drove the real TUI through a tmux pty — both the Cards tab table and the adjust-limit modal's header render the literal bracket text with no live escape sequence. go build/go vet/go test clean for cli and tui, gofmt clean, 0 regressions.
Agentic multi-tenant spend controller for the Airwallex Agentic Banking Hackathon — Starter Kit 5: Platform Spend Controller (Multi-Tenant Platforms track).
Issue customer cards and ration bridge funding when deposits arrive late.
No web dashboard. This is a systems project: a Rust ledger core backed by a hand-rolled C write-ahead log, a Go gateway that owns the Airwallex integration, a Go agent loop that makes the actual rationing decisions (policy rules + an LLM for judgment calls), and a terminal UI for judges to watch it work live.
Engineering standard: this is built to the bar of production fintech infrastructure, not hackathon scaffolding — real crash-safety (see the WAL recovery tests), a hard-rule money-safety invariant the LLM can never override, and a scale-out roadmap (service decomposition, observability, infra-as-code, formal verification, fuzzing/chaos testing — see docs/SCALE-EXPANSION.md) aimed at unicorn-scale production use, not a weekend demo.
Architecture
┌─────────────────────┐
│ tui / cli (Go) │ terminal dashboard + demo driver
└──────────┬───────────┘
│ gRPC
┌──────────▼───────────┐ ┌────────────────────┐
Airwallex API <──►│ gateway (Go) │──────►│ agent (Go) │
(mock or live) │ issuing/global accts │ gRPC │ policy + LLM loop │
│ webhooks, multi-tenant│◄──────│ tool-calling │
└──────────┬───────────┘ └────────────────────┘
│ gRPC
┌──────────▼───────────┐
│ ledger-core (Rust) │ authoritative balances,
│ double-entry, reserve │ deposits, reserve floor
│ floor enforcement │
└──────────┬───────────┘
│ FFI
┌──────────▼───────────┐
│ wal (C) │ crash-safe append log +
│ write-ahead log │ recovery, fsync-correct
└───────────────────────┘
See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md for the full design, docs/AGENT-DESIGN.md for the agent/policy design, and docs/AIRWALLEX-SETUP.md for sandbox access status.
Services
| Service | Language | Role |
|---|---|---|
services/wal |
C | Crash-safe write-ahead log: append, fsync, recover. |
services/ledger-core |
Rust | Double-entry ledger, reserve-floor enforcement, deposit tracking. gRPC server over the C WAL. |
services/gateway |
Go | Airwallex Issuing/Global Accounts/webhooks client (mock + live), multi-tenant routing, fronts ledger-core. |
services/agent |
Go | Agentic loop: watches late deposits, decides card issuance / bridge rationing, calls an LLM for non-deterministic judgment calls, executes via gateway. |
services/tui |
Go (Bubble Tea) | Terminal dashboard: tenants, deposits, cards, live agent activity feed. |
services/cli |
Go | Operator CLI: seed demo tenants, simulate deposits, force late-deposit scenarios for judging. |
proto/ |
Protobuf | Wire contracts shared by every service. |
Quickstart
make proto # generate Go stubs from proto/
make build # build all services
make run-demo # starts wal-backed ledger-core, gateway (mock Airwallex), agent, seeds 3 tenants
./bin/tui # watch it live in a second terminal
Airwallex mode
AIRWALLEX_MODE=mock (default) runs entirely against an in-process fake
that mirrors the real Issuing/Global Accounts/webhook contracts byte-for-byte
so flipping to AIRWALLEX_MODE=live with real sandbox credentials is a
one-line env change, not a rewrite. Sandbox platform access is pending
organizer approval — see docs/AIRWALLEX-SETUP.md.
What integration actually found
Six services were built independently against a pinned proto/architecture spec, then integrated. Integration is where real bugs show up — compile errors are the easy part. Three were found and fixed, not papered over:
- A proto-regeneration collision that silently shadowed checked-in generated code.
ledger-coreand every client disagreeing on which env var carried the listen address — the stack would never actually connect with default config.- The one that mattered:
MarkDepositReceivedupdated deposit status but never credited the ledger, so every tenant's balance was permanently stuck at0. Reserve-floor headroom was always negative, so the bridge-funding policy could only ever decline — the entire agentic rationing feature, the actual point of this submission, could never produce a real grant. Fixed at the ledger level with an idempotent mark-and-credit in a single WAL frame, covered by new tests.
The full, reproducible demo run (seed → simulate a late deposit → agent grants a partial bridge with a computed rationale → a second request correctly declines once the 24h velocity cap engages) is documented in docs/DEMO-SCRIPT.md. The submission writeup is in docs/SUBMISSION.md.
Contributing
Each service is its own module with its own tests — run the relevant one
(go test ./... in a Go service, cargo test in ledger-core, make test
in services/wal) before opening a PR. Money-path changes (anything that
touches ledger-core::ledger or services/gateway/internal/bridge) need a
test that exercises the reserve-floor invariant — see
docs/AGENT-DESIGN.md for the exact rules it must
never violate.
License
Apache-2.0 — see LICENSE.
