Security fix plus team access. Before this change any valid API key,
including access keys the delivery system hands to BUYERS, authenticated
as the merchant on the whole management API, and GET /v1/api-keys listed
every organization's keys. Now only platform keys (issued at sign-up or
via POST /v1/api-keys/platform, marked with the platform product id) can
call the API, and each request needs its resource scope
(<resource>:read|write, write implies read; platform:admin or * for
full access), answered with 403 and details.requiredScope otherwise.
Keys cannot mint broader keys, customer keys cannot carry management
scopes, key listing is tenant-scoped and keys can be revoked by id.
Dashboard sessions get team roles (owner, admin, developer, support,
viewer) mapped to scopes. /v1/team manages members and email
invitations (packages/invitations, token hash only, 7-day expiry);
/v1/auth/invitations/accept joins the org and creates the account. The
last owner is protected and only owners grant owner. Dashboard: Team
page, invite accept page, and an API keys page that creates restricted
keys and shows the secret once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- AuthService.unlinkWallet — clears the linked wallet, refusing to strand a
wallet-only account (no password) from its only sign-in method.
- DELETE /v1/auth/wallet (bearer); dashboard Unlink button + /api/wallet/link DELETE.
- InMemoryAuthStore.saveAccount removes the stale wallet index on unlink (Pg: column→NULL).
- docs/DEVELOPMENT_ROADMAP.md: phased feature plan driving the continuous loop.
- 1308 tests / 213 suites, typecheck + builds green.
CRITICAL-1: validate SIWE domain/chainId server-side (EIP-4361 cross-site replay guard); AuthService gains siweDomain/siweChainIds, wired from AUTH_SIWE_DOMAIN/AUTH_SIWE_CHAIN_IDS in apps/api context.
CRITICAL-2: UNIQUE index on auth_accounts.wallet_address (migration 0007) as the final gate against the link/login race; loginWithWallet + linkWallet catch the violation -> conflict. Verified on live Postgres (dup rejected, NULLs allowed).
CRITICAL-3: /api/session (dashboard + portal) now verify the token with the API before persisting the cookie (no session fixation); + same-origin check on cookie-setting + /api/wallet/link routes (MEDIUM-3 CSRF).
HIGH-1: require expirationTime; enforce notBefore + issuedAt skew (shared verifyWalletMessage); clients now set expirationTime.
HIGH-2 (rate-limiting, task a): /v1/auth no longer exempt — stricter AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE (default 20) in a separate bucket; opportunistic expired-nonce prune (store + Pg).
HIGH-3: reserve the wallet email domain — block email/magic-link registration on it (no synthetic-email squatting).
HIGH-4: gate X-Forwarded-For trust behind TRUST_PROXY.
LOW-1: require a 65-byte (130-hex) ECDSA signature at the API boundary.
+ web3 tests for domain mismatch, missing-expiration, reserved-email. 1308 tests / 213 suites, typecheck + full build green; migrations 0006/0007 verified on Postgres.