- PgX402NonceStore (x402_nonces, migration 0012): reserve is INSERT ... ON
CONFLICT DO NOTHING on the primary key, so one settle wins across replicas.
The API wires it whenever DATABASE_URL is set; otherwise the facilitator
falls back to the in-memory store and logs a boot warning. One store is
now shared by every per-environment facilitator part.
- allowedPayTo defaults to this deployment's own EVM receiving addresses
(X402_EVM_PAY_TO + X402_PAY_TO_<CHAIN>); an empty allowlist refuses every
recipient, and only X402_FACILITATOR_ALLOWED_PAY_TO=* opens the relayer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in packages/routing, packages/hyperliquid (hypercore network), checkout
AnyTokenPay/HyperCorePay, Node 22 pins, tenant-ownership guards and the zcash
tag lock. Only conflict: drizzle _journal.json (kept 0010_onchain_billing and
0011_coupons_organization in order).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0010 adds onchain_subscriptions, onchain_charges (UNIQUE per
subscription+period) and onchain_escrow_payments. PgOnchainBillingStore
claims a period under a row lock so API and worker replicas can never
charge the same period twice. Adds shared access hooks (extend/suspend
core subscription, record payments, expire entitlements) and links
escrow payments to their checkout session.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Coupons gain an organizationId (column + migration 0010); legacy rows with no
owner stay hidden from every tenant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace payments_tx_hash_idx with a unique index on payments.tx_hash
(WHERE tx_hash IS NOT NULL) so a transaction can settle at most one
payment across processes. Migration 0009 + schema test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CRITICAL-1: validate SIWE domain/chainId server-side (EIP-4361 cross-site replay guard); AuthService gains siweDomain/siweChainIds, wired from AUTH_SIWE_DOMAIN/AUTH_SIWE_CHAIN_IDS in apps/api context.
CRITICAL-2: UNIQUE index on auth_accounts.wallet_address (migration 0007) as the final gate against the link/login race; loginWithWallet + linkWallet catch the violation -> conflict. Verified on live Postgres (dup rejected, NULLs allowed).
CRITICAL-3: /api/session (dashboard + portal) now verify the token with the API before persisting the cookie (no session fixation); + same-origin check on cookie-setting + /api/wallet/link routes (MEDIUM-3 CSRF).
HIGH-1: require expirationTime; enforce notBefore + issuedAt skew (shared verifyWalletMessage); clients now set expirationTime.
HIGH-2 (rate-limiting, task a): /v1/auth no longer exempt — stricter AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE (default 20) in a separate bucket; opportunistic expired-nonce prune (store + Pg).
HIGH-3: reserve the wallet email domain — block email/magic-link registration on it (no synthetic-email squatting).
HIGH-4: gate X-Forwarded-For trust behind TRUST_PROXY.
LOW-1: require a 65-byte (130-hex) ECDSA signature at the API boundary.
+ web3 tests for domain mismatch, missing-expiration, reserved-email. 1308 tests / 213 suites, typecheck + full build green; migrations 0006/0007 verified on Postgres.