settlekit/apps/checkout/lib/same-origin.ts
caelum0x fa072dc24f feat(checkout): network selection, EVM and Zcash payment routes
- POST [sessionId]/network switches between accepted, configured networks
  only while open and unpaid; pins payTo per network, clears the payer,
  adds a Solana reference and locks a ZEC quote (kept while live)
- GET evm/params (registry chain, public RPC for wallet_addEthereumChain,
  exact base units, Tempo memo) and POST evm/payer (payer binding)
- POST zcash/uri (ZIP-321 request) and GET zcash/status (claimed txid or
  cached address scan, confirming / review / paid)
- same-origin guard on state-changing routes; error bodies carry a code
- demo seed sessions accept every chain; the placeholder EVM address is
  only offered on testnets, Solana/Zcash only with configured addresses
- tests: evm-confirm, zcash-confirm, network-select

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 17:03:51 +03:00

51 lines
1.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* CSRF guard for state-changing checkout routes.
*
* Browsers attach `Origin` (and `Sec-Fetch-Site`) to cross-site POSTs. A
* request is refused when the browser marks it cross-site, or when its
* Origin is not this deployment (CHECKOUT_PUBLIC_URL, the forwarded host, or
* the request host). Requests without these headers (curl, server-to-server)
* pass: they carry no ambient buyer credentials to abuse, and every write is
* still validated against the session.
*
* The Solana Pay transaction-request route is deliberately NOT guarded:
* wallets call it cross-origin by design.
*/
import { CheckoutError } from "./errors";
function hostOf(value: string | null | undefined): string | undefined {
if (!value) return undefined;
try {
return new URL(value).host.toLowerCase();
} catch {
return undefined;
}
}
/** Hosts this deployment answers on. */
function allowedHosts(request: Request): Set<string> {
const hosts = new Set<string>();
const configured = hostOf(process.env.CHECKOUT_PUBLIC_URL?.trim());
if (configured) hosts.add(configured);
const forwarded = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-host")?.split(",")[0]?.trim().toLowerCase();
if (forwarded) hosts.add(forwarded);
const host = request.headers.get("host")?.trim().toLowerCase();
if (host) hosts.add(host);
const own = hostOf(request.url);
if (own) hosts.add(own);
return hosts;
}
/** Throw `forbidden_origin` unless `request` is same-origin (or header-less). */
export function assertSameOrigin(request: Request): void {
if (request.headers.get("sec-fetch-site") === "cross-site") {
throw new CheckoutError("forbidden_origin", "Cross-site requests are not allowed.");
}
const origin = request.headers.get("origin");
if (origin === null || origin === "") return;
const host = hostOf(origin);
if (host === undefined || !allowedHosts(request).has(host)) {
throw new CheckoutError("forbidden_origin", "Cross-site requests are not allowed.");
}
}