CRITICAL-1: validate SIWE domain/chainId server-side (EIP-4361 cross-site replay guard); AuthService gains siweDomain/siweChainIds, wired from AUTH_SIWE_DOMAIN/AUTH_SIWE_CHAIN_IDS in apps/api context.
CRITICAL-2: UNIQUE index on auth_accounts.wallet_address (migration 0007) as the final gate against the link/login race; loginWithWallet + linkWallet catch the violation -> conflict. Verified on live Postgres (dup rejected, NULLs allowed).
CRITICAL-3: /api/session (dashboard + portal) now verify the token with the API before persisting the cookie (no session fixation); + same-origin check on cookie-setting + /api/wallet/link routes (MEDIUM-3 CSRF).
HIGH-1: require expirationTime; enforce notBefore + issuedAt skew (shared verifyWalletMessage); clients now set expirationTime.
HIGH-2 (rate-limiting, task a): /v1/auth no longer exempt — stricter AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE (default 20) in a separate bucket; opportunistic expired-nonce prune (store + Pg).
HIGH-3: reserve the wallet email domain — block email/magic-link registration on it (no synthetic-email squatting).
HIGH-4: gate X-Forwarded-For trust behind TRUST_PROXY.
LOW-1: require a 65-byte (130-hex) ECDSA signature at the API boundary.
+ web3 tests for domain mismatch, missing-expiration, reserved-email. 1308 tests / 213 suites, typecheck + full build green; migrations 0006/0007 verified on Postgres.