Delta review of 10680b3d15a found:
- The whole-value lookahead added for PROXY_DEST rejected a Basic pair
whose quote opens before the NAME, so "MY_PROXY_BASIC=user:pw" in a
YAML list, a JSON/Python array or a single-quoted string leaked again
in force mode. Closing quotes, ] and } and a backtick now end the
value too; a / still does not, so PROXY_DEST keeps its path.
- The ODBC template test accepted only bare identifiers, so code reads
(cat app.py) masked f-string and C# interpolations:
{os.environ['DB_PASS']}, {config["Db:Password"]}, {get_pw()},
{pw!r}, { pw }, {1:s}. A brace opening with a digit or identifier
and carrying no ; or nested brace is a template now. {Zq7x;LmP2},
{abc}}def} and {#...} still count as ODBC literals and are masked.
The new cases fail on 10680b3d15a and pass here.
1934 lines
102 KiB
Python
1934 lines
102 KiB
Python
"""Regex-based secret redaction for logs and tool output.
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Short tokens (< 18 chars) are fully masked; longer ones keep the first 6 and
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last 4 characters for debuggability.
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"""
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import logging
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import os
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import re
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import shlex
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import threading
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import unicodedata
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from urllib.parse import unquote_plus
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# Shared with agent/file_safety's read-block list so the two defenses can't
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# drift: a blocked file_tools read that falls back to ``cat`` is still caught.
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from agent.file_safety import _BLOCKED_PROJECT_ENV_BASENAMES as _ENV_FILE_BASENAMES
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from agent.redact_connstr import _KV_CONNSTR_GATE_RE, _redact_kv_connection_strings
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Browser and CDP results can be a page-controlled JSON tree. The walkers stop
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# at this depth and replace the remainder, so a nested payload cannot raise
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# RecursionError on the way to the model.
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REDACT_WALK_MAX_DEPTH = 320
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REDACT_WALK_DEPTH_MARKER = "[redacted: nesting limit]"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Vault-value redaction registry (profile-scoped, bounded)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Exact secret values that transited a server-side vault fill (browser_vault). Generic
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# credential-shaped regexes cannot catch an arbitrary user password, so the fill path registers
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# the exact bytes and every browser_* tool result (including browser_cdp Runtime.evaluate
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# passthrough) is scrubbed against them before it can reach the model. Memory only: never
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# persisted or logged. Keyed by profile home so a multiplex gateway never scrubs profile B's
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# output with profile A's passwords (which would also confirm to B that the bytes exist), and
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# bounded per profile: a fill-heavy session evicts its oldest entries rather than growing forever.
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_VAULT_REDACTION_MAX_PER_PROFILE = 64
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_VAULT_REDACTION_VALUES: dict = {} # profile home → ordered {value: None}
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_VAULT_REDACTION_LOCK = threading.Lock()
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def _vault_scope() -> str:
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from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
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return str(get_hermes_home())
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def register_vault_redaction_value(value) -> None:
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"""Register an exact vault secret value for model-facing redaction.
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Called by the vault fill path BEFORE the injection happens, so no later browser tool result
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can echo the value back into model context. Also registers the form a text input normalizes
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it to (CR/LF stripped), since that is what the page holds.
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"""
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
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return
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normalized = value.replace("\r", "").replace("\n", "")
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with _VAULT_REDACTION_LOCK:
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bucket = _VAULT_REDACTION_VALUES.setdefault(_vault_scope(), {})
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for v in (value, normalized):
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if v:
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bucket.pop(v, None) # re-registering refreshes recency
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bucket[v] = None
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while len(bucket) > _VAULT_REDACTION_MAX_PER_PROFILE:
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del bucket[next(iter(bucket))]
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def clear_vault_redaction_values() -> None:
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"""Drop the current profile's registered values (profile teardown / explicit lock)."""
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with _VAULT_REDACTION_LOCK:
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_VAULT_REDACTION_VALUES.pop(_vault_scope(), None)
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def redact_registered_vault_values(text: str) -> str:
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"""Exact-substring scrub of every vault secret value registered for the current profile."""
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if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
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return text
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with _VAULT_REDACTION_LOCK:
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bucket = _VAULT_REDACTION_VALUES.get(_vault_scope())
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values = sorted(bucket, key=len, reverse=True) if bucket else () # longest first: a substring never shadows its superstring
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for value in values:
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if value in text:
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text = text.replace(value, "«redacted-vault-secret»")
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return text
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# Sensitive query-string param names (case-insensitive): opaque tokens / OAuth
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# codes / pre-signed signatures with no vendor prefix.
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# Ported from nearai/ironclaw#2529 — catches tokens whose values don't match any known vendor prefix regex
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# (e.g. opaque tokens, short OAuth codes).
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_SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMS = frozenset({
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"access_token", "refresh_token", "id_token", "token", "api_key", "apikey",
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"client_secret", "password", "auth", "jwt", "session", "secret", "key",
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"code", "signature", "x-amz-signature",
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"x-goog-signature", "sig", # GCS V4 signed URLs, Azure SAS tokens
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})
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# Snapshot at import time so runtime env mutations (e.g. an LLM-generated
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# `export HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS=false`) cannot disable redaction mid-session.
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# ON by default; `security.redact_secrets: false` bridges to this env var.
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# ON by default — secure default per issue #17691. Users who need raw credential values in tool output (e.g.
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# working on the redactor itself) can opt out via `security.redact_secrets: false` in config.yaml (bridged
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# to this env var in hermes_cli/main.py, gateway/run.py, and cli.py) or `HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS=false` in
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# ~/.hermes/.env. An opt-out warning is logged at gateway and CLI startup so operators see the downgrade —
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# see `_log_redaction_status()` in gateway/run.py and cli.py.
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_REDACT_ENABLED = os.getenv("HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS", "true").lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
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# Routed multiplex profiles: the import-time snapshot above is the LAUNCH profile's policy. A profile
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# served under a HERMES_HOME override follows its own ``security.redact_secrets`` (its ``.env`` value
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# first, like the standalone bridge in hermes_cli/main.py). The formatter never reads config or files
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# for it (it runs under the logging handler's lock, per record): the values are recorded when that
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# profile's .env / config is loaded (``note_env_policy`` / ``note_config_policy``) or when log routing
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# is set up for it (``resolve_profile_policy``). Until then the profile redacts (the secure default).
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_ENV_POLICY_BY_HOME: dict = {} # home key -> raw HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS from its .env, or None
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_CONFIG_POLICY_BY_HOME: dict = {} # home key -> raw security.redact_secrets from its config, or None
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def note_env_policy(home_key: str, raw) -> None:
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_ENV_POLICY_BY_HOME[home_key] = None if raw is None else str(raw)
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def note_config_policy(home_key: str, raw) -> None:
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_CONFIG_POLICY_BY_HOME[home_key] = None if raw is None else str(raw)
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def resolve_profile_policy(home) -> None:
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"""Record ``home``'s redaction policy now (log-routing setup), so its records never wait for it."""
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from hermes_constants import hermes_home_key, reset_hermes_home_override, set_hermes_home_override
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token = set_hermes_home_override(home)
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try:
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key = hermes_home_key()
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from hermes_cli.config import load_config_readonly, load_env
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note_env_policy(key, load_env().get("HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS"))
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note_config_policy(key, (load_config_readonly().get("security") or {}).get("redact_secrets"))
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except (Exception, SystemExit) as exc: # health: allow BLE001 -- unreadable now: stays unknown, which redacts
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logging.getLogger(__name__).debug("redaction policy for %s not read: %s", home, exc)
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finally:
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reset_hermes_home_override(token)
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def _redact_enabled() -> bool:
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"""Effective redaction switch for the active profile (launch snapshot when no override). Reads
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only in-memory state: the live secret scope and the recorded per-profile policy."""
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from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home_override, hermes_home_key
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if get_hermes_home_override() is None:
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return _REDACT_ENABLED
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home_key = hermes_home_key()
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from agent.secret_scope import current_secret_scope
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scope = current_secret_scope()
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raw = scope.get("HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS") if scope else None
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if raw is None and scope is None:
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# No live scope (the log listener thread formats routed records): the profile's own .env, as
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# its scope would have it. Not recorded yet: redact, since .env may opt the profile back in.
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if home_key not in _ENV_POLICY_BY_HOME:
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return True
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raw = _ENV_POLICY_BY_HOME[home_key]
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if raw is None:
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raw = _CONFIG_POLICY_BY_HOME.get(home_key)
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if raw is None:
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return True
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return str(raw).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
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# Known API key prefixes -- match the prefix + contiguous token chars.
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# Every pattern MUST start with a literal prefix: _PREFIX_SUBSTRINGS (the cheap
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# pre-screen gate) is derived from these literals and must stay false-negative-free.
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_PREFIX_PATTERNS = [
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# Some provider-issued ``sk-`` keys carry dot-delimited body segments (Alibaba
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# ``sk-sp-…``/``sk-ws-…``). Each unit is one body char optionally preceded by
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# a single dot, so the body ends on its last non-dot char (sentence punctuation
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# is never consumed) and can never span ``..``: the ``sk-pro...EFGH`` display
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# mask is left alone by a second redaction pass instead of collapsing to
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# ``***``. Kept free of nested unbounded repeats so the pattern passes the
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# same structural gate plugins must.
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r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-](?:\.?[A-Za-z0-9_-]){9,}",
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# Context7 API keys: a fixed vendor prefix (``ctx7sk-``) plus an opaque body.
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# The generic ``sk-`` family cannot catch it: the matcher's lookbehind
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# rejects a prefix preceded by a word char, and here the ``sk-`` sits inside
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# ``ctx7sk-`` - so a bare Context7 key passed through unmasked (#142576).
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r"ctx7sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}",
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r"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub PAT (classic)
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r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}", # GitHub PAT (fine-grained)
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r"gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub OAuth access token
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r"ghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub user-to-server token
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r"ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub server-to-server token
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r"ghr_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub refresh token
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r"xapp-\d+-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}", # Slack app-Level token
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r"xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}", # Slack bot/app/user tokens
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r"AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}", # Google API keys
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r"pplx-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Perplexity
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r"fal_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # Fal.ai
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r"fc-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Firecrawl
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r"bb_live_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # BrowserBase
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r"gAAAA[A-Za-z0-9_=-]{20,}", # Codex encrypted tokens
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r"AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}", # AWS Access Key ID
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r"sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe secret key (live)
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r"sk_test_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe secret key (test)
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r"rk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe restricted key
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r"SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # SendGrid API key
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r"hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # HuggingFace token
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r"r8_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Replicate API token
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r"npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # npm access token
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r"pypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # PyPI API token
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r"dop_v1_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # DigitalOcean PAT
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r"doo_v1_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # DigitalOcean OAuth
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# AgentMail API key: ``am_`` / ``am_org_`` + an opaque alphanumeric body. The body has no ``_``/``-``,
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# which is what separates it from ``am_example_identifier_123`` (#10983); public docs pin only the
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# prefix, so the charset stays broad and the length floor does the discriminating.
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r"am_(?:org_)?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}",
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r"sk_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}", # ElevenLabs TTS key (sk_ underscore, not sk- dash)
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r"tvly-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Tavily search API key
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r"exa_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Exa search API key
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r"gsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Groq Cloud API key
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r"syt_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Matrix access token
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r"retaindb_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # RetainDB API key
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r"hsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Hindsight API key
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r"mem0_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Mem0 Platform API key
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r"brv_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # ByteRover API key
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r"xai-[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}", # xAI (Grok) API key
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r"ntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Notion internal integration token
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r"fw-[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}", # Fireworks AI API key
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r"fw_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}", # Fireworks AI API key
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r"fpk_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}", # Fireworks AI project key
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# GitLab token families (each keeps a full literal prefix for the pre-screen).
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# Ported from openclaw/openclaw#112954; follow-up invited in #4541.
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r"glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab personal access token
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r"gloas-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab OAuth application secret
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r"gldt-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab deploy token
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r"glrt-[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]{10,}", # GitLab runner authentication token (routable tokens are dotted)
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r"glrtr-[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]{10,}", # GitLab runner registration token (routable)
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r"glcbt-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab CI/CD job token
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r"glptt-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab pipeline trigger token
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r"glft-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab feed token
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r"glimt-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab incoming mail token
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r"glagent-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab agent (KAS) token
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r"glsoat-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab service-account access token
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r"glffct-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab feature-flags client token
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r"glwt-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab workspace token
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r"GR1348941[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}", # GitLab legacy runner registration token
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r"pk-lf-[A-Za-z0-9\-]{8,}", # Langfuse public key (sk-lf- already covered by sk- pattern)
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]
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# ENV assignment: KEY=value where KEY carries a secret-like name. Uppercase keys
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# tolerate spaces around "=" and allow the keyword embedded anywhere
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# (``MYTOKEN=…``) — an all-caps key is almost never prose. Bare ``KEY``/``PASS``/
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# ``PW`` suffixes are included; _key_has_secret_keyword rejects ``KEYBOARD=``.
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# The regex is IGNORECASE so lowercase env names (``openai_key=…``) are caught here too. The secret name
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# must sit at a word boundary (``_``-delimited or whole-word) so generic prose words (``password=``,
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# ``token=``, ``KEYBOARD=``, ``PASSAGE=``) do not match — those are handled by the config/form/URL paths,
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# and a bare ``password=…`` in a form body must not be swallowed greedily by ``\S+``. See #77484.
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_SECRET_ENV_NAMES = r"(?:API_?KEY|KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PASS|PW|CREDENTIAL|AUTH)"
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_ENV_ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(rf"([A-Z0-9_]{{0,50}}{_SECRET_ENV_NAMES}[A-Z0-9_]{{0,50}})\s*=\s*(['\"]?)(\S+)\2")
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# Command-line credentials. ``--password=…``, ``--token …`` and ``docker login -p …`` reach
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# the approval card and the chat egress verbatim because the ENV passes only look at
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# ``NAME=value`` (issue #143982). The flag name is kept so the reader still knows what was
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# passed; only the value is masked. ``-p`` is scoped to a container ``login`` because
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# everywhere else it is a port or a path.
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# Each quote style is matched on its own, so ``"Abc'def ghi"`` is consumed whole instead of
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# falling back to ``\S+`` at the apostrophe and leaving the tail visible. A double-quoted
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# value honours backslash escapes (``"a\"b c"``) and a single-quoted one the shell's
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# ``'\''`` splice, and either may span a newline. The body is capped and possessive: an
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# unterminated or over-long quote masks through the end of its line instead of only its
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# first word, and never rescans the rest of the text from every flag.
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_QUOTED_FLAG_VALUE = (r"\"(?:\\[\s\S]|[^\"\\]){1,512}+\"|'(?:'\\''|[^']){1,512}+'"
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r"|[\"'][^\n]*+|\S+")
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_CLI_SECRET_FLAG_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?P<flag>(?<![\w-])--?(?:password|passwd|passphrase|pass|token|api[-_]?key|apikey"
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r"|client[-_]?secret|access[-_]?key|account[-_]?key|auth[-_]?token|session[-_]?token|secret|bearer"
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r"|credential)s?)"
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r"(?P<sep>\s*=|\s+)"
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rf"(?P<value>{_QUOTED_FLAG_VALUE})",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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_CLI_LOGIN_P_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?P<flag>\b(?:docker|podman|nerdctl)\s+login\b[^\n;|&]*?\s-p\s*)"
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rf"(?P<value>{_QUOTED_FLAG_VALUE})"
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)
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# Azure connection-string keys. They are ``Name=value`` inside a quoted string, so
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# every ENV pass declines them: the name is mixed case and carries no underscore boundary.
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# The key must open a connection-string segment (start, ``;``, ``,``, a URL ``?``/``&``, a quote or whitespace before
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# it, no space around ``=``): ``this.accountKey = x`` / ``dt.PrimaryKey = new …`` in source
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# read through read_file or a terminal stays byte-identical, or the agent cannot patch it.
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# A spaced ``AccountKey = …`` (ini files, PowerShell) only counts when the value is a
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# 16+ char base64 run carrying a digit, which an identifier like ``config.Key`` or
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# ``StorageAccountKeyFromVault`` is not.
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_CONNSTR_SECRET_KEY_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?P<flag>(?<![^;,?&'\"\s])(?:AccountKey|SharedAccessKey|(?P<sas>SharedAccessSignature))"
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r"(?:=|[ \t]*+=[ \t]*+(?=[A-Za-z+/]*[0-9])(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,}={0,2}(?![\w.(]))))"
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# A SAS value is itself a query string (``sv=…&sig=…``): it runs through the ``sig=``
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# parameter and stops there, or at a ``;`` / ``)`` / ``,`` / ``|`` / backtick delimiter.
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r"(?P<value>(?(sas)(?:(?!sig=)[^;\s'\"&),`|]++&)*+(?:sig=)?[^;\s'\"&),`|]*+|[^;\s'\"&]+))",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# Cheap pre-gates: every flag the regexes above can match contains one of these.
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_CLI_SECRET_FLAG_GATE = re.compile(r"-{1,2}[A-Za-z]")
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_CLI_LOGIN_GATE = re.compile(r"(?:docker|podman|nerdctl)\s+login\b", re.IGNORECASE)
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_CONNSTR_GATE = re.compile(r"(?:AccountKey|SharedAccessKey|SharedAccessSignature)", re.IGNORECASE)
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# Lowercase env names: only underscore-boundary forms (``openai_key=``) — NOT
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# bare ``password=``/``token=``, which appear in prose, URLs, and form bodies.
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# The lookbehind anchors each attempt to the start of an identifier run; without
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# it re.sub retries the greedy prefix at every byte of a long opaque payload.
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# See #77484.
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_ENV_ASSIGN_LOWER_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"(?<![a-z0-9_])([a-z0-9_]+(?:_|^)(?:key|pass|pw|token|secret|password|passwd|credential|auth)(?=[^a-z0-9_]|$))\s*=\s*(['\"]?)(\S+)\2",
|
||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# Lowercase / dotted config-file keys (``spring.datasource.password=x``,
|
||
# line-start ``password=x``). Carve-outs vs prose/code/URLs: values stop at
|
||
# whitespace AND ``&`` (form bodies go pair-by-pair via _redact_form_body);
|
||
# _CFG_DOTTED_RE needs a NAMESPACED key; _CFG_ANCHORED_RE needs line start
|
||
# (optionally after ``export``). The ``://`` URL guard lives at the call site.
|
||
# The uppercase _ENV_ASSIGN_RE above never matched these, so config-file passwords leaked verbatim (issue
|
||
# #16413). These run only in a config-file context, NOT in prose, code, or URLs — three carve-outs preserved
|
||
# from the original design (#4367 + the documented web-URL passthrough below): 1. The value is bounded by
|
||
# ``[^\s&]`` (stops at whitespace AND ``&``) so form-urlencoded bodies are handled pair-by-pair (by
|
||
# _redact_form_body), not greedily swallowed. 2. _CFG_DOTTED_RE only matches when the key is NAMESPACED
|
||
# (contains a dot), which is unambiguously a config key — never a prose word. 3. _CFG_ANCHORED_RE matches a
|
||
# bare secret-word key only at line start (optionally after ``export``), so conversational ``I have
|
||
# password=foo`` mid-sentence is left alone.
|
||
_SECRET_CFG_NAMES = r"(?:api[ _.\-]?key|token|secret|passwd|password|credential|auth)"
|
||
# Rendered line-number prefix: ``5|line`` (read_file), ``6:line`` (grep -n), ``7-line`` (grep -A/-B/-C
|
||
# context lines) and `` 8\tline`` (cat -n / nl: right-aligned number + TAB). Callers put the ONLY
|
||
# leading ``[ \t]*`` in front of it — stacking a second whitespace run around an optional gutter made
|
||
# the anchored passes quadratic on long indented lines (2s per 5k spaces).
|
||
_LINE_NUMBER_GUTTER = r"(?:[0-9]+(?:[|:\-]|\t)[ \t]*)?"
|
||
_CFG_VALUE = r"(['\"]?)([^\s&]+?)\2(?=[\s&]|$)"
|
||
# Linear pre-gate for the _CFG_*_RE subs: no secret keyword => neither can match.
|
||
_CFG_SECRET_WORD_RE = re.compile(_SECRET_CFG_NAMES, re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
# Programmatic env lookups (``os.getenv(...)``, ``process.env.X``, ``$ENV{X}``)
|
||
# as the VALUE of a KEY=... match name a variable; they are not a leaked secret.
|
||
_ENV_LOOKUP_VALUE_RE = re.compile(r"^(?:os\.(?:getenv|environ)|process\.env|\$ENV\{)")
|
||
# Namespaced key: the secret word may sit anywhere in a dotted path.
|
||
# NOTE(perf): possessive quantifiers (nested ``(?:[...]+\.)+`` backtracked
|
||
# exponentially); the ``*`` runs bordering {_SECRET_CFG_NAMES} must stay
|
||
# backtrackable (``app.api.key=``). The lookbehind anchors each attempt to a key
|
||
# run start so re.sub is not quadratic; the match set is unchanged.
|
||
_CFG_DOTTED_RE = re.compile(
|
||
rf"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.\-])"
|
||
rf"([A-Za-z0-9_\-]++\.[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*{_SECRET_CFG_NAMES}[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*+"
|
||
rf"|[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*{_SECRET_CFG_NAMES}[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*\.[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]++)"
|
||
rf"={_CFG_VALUE}",
|
||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||
)
|
||
# Line-anchored bare key: ``password=…`` / ``export api_key=…`` at start of line.
|
||
# ``{_LINE_NUMBER_GUTTER}``: line-numbered dumps put the key behind a rendered gutter —
|
||
# ``read_file`` emits ``5| ADS_API_TOKEN: …``, ``grep -n`` emits ``6: ADS_API_TOKEN: …``
|
||
# and ``cat -n`` emits `` 7\tADS_API_TOKEN: …``. Anchored at ``^`` without it, none of those
|
||
# matched, so the rendered read of a secret-bearing file leaked what the raw text masked.
|
||
_CFG_ANCHORED_RE = re.compile(
|
||
rf"(^[ \t]*{_LINE_NUMBER_GUTTER}(?:export[ \t]+)?[A-Za-z0-9_\-]*{_SECRET_CFG_NAMES}[A-Za-z0-9_\-]*)={_CFG_VALUE}",
|
||
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# YAML / colon config: bare-key quoted scalars cannot match _JSON_FIELD_RE.
|
||
# Match escaped double quotes, doubled single quotes, or an unquoted token.
|
||
# An unterminated quote masks to end-of-line; no branch crosses LF or CRLF.
|
||
# NOTE(perf): possessive where the successor is disjoint; the leading class
|
||
# stays backtrackable (see _CFG_DOTTED_RE).
|
||
_YAML_CFG_NAMES = (
|
||
r"(?:api[ _.\-]?key|token|secret|passwd|password|credential"
|
||
r"|client[ _.\-]?key[ _.\-]?data|(?:private|signing|encryption|master|hmac)[ _.\-]?key)"
|
||
)
|
||
_YAML_ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(
|
||
rf"(^[ \t]*+{_LINE_NUMBER_GUTTER}[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*{_YAML_CFG_NAMES}[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*+)(:[ \t]*+)"
|
||
r"(\"(?:\\[^\r\n]|[^\"\\\r\n])*\"|'(?:''|[^'\r\n])*'|['\"][^\r\n]*|[^\s&]++)",
|
||
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
_YAML_CFG_WORD_RE = re.compile(_YAML_CFG_NAMES, re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
# Word-boundary validation for the key patterns above: their classes allow
|
||
# arbitrary affixes (``client_secret``, ``s3.secret-key``), which also matched
|
||
# prose CONTAINING a keyword (``Secretary:``, ``tokenizer:``). A keyword counts
|
||
# only at a word boundary: key edge, next to a non-letter, or a camelCase
|
||
# transition (``clientSecret``, ``APIToken``); trailing plural ``s`` is part of
|
||
# it. Concatenations match via explicit alternatives (``authtoken``, ``apikey``).
|
||
# The side effect: ordinary prose/document words that merely CONTAIN a keyword also matched — ``Secretary:
|
||
# J.Smith`` (secret), ``tokenizer: cl100k_base`` (token), ``author=Smith`` (auth) — mangling legitimate
|
||
# content on the surfaces that run these passes (browser snapshots, log lines, kanban summaries, CLI-echoed
|
||
# command output). Ported from nearai/ironclaw#6129, where the same substring false positive ("Secretary of
|
||
# the Treasury" matching the ``secret`` marker) scrubbed legitimate tool results from the replayed
|
||
# transcript and sent the model into a re-fetch loop. Common concatenated compounds keep matching via
|
||
# explicit alternatives (``authtoken`` ngrok, ``authkey`` tailscale, ``secretkey`` minio, ``apikey``).
|
||
# Embedded occurrences inside a larger word (``secretary``, ``tokenizer``, ``authored``, ``credentialing``)
|
||
# no longer match. ALL-CAPS keys keep the legacy embedded matching (``MYTOKEN=…``) — an all-caps key is
|
||
# almost never prose, the same rationale as _ENV_ASSIGN_RE.
|
||
_KEY_KEYWORD_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"(?:api|auth|access|refresh|session|secret)[ _.\\-]?(?:key|token)"
|
||
r"|token|secret|passwd|password|pass|pw|credential|auth|key",
|
||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# Key names that are credential-specific even when their values are short or
|
||
# human-readable. Bare ``token`` / ``key`` are intentionally absent: they also
|
||
# describe model limits, tensor names, and cache keys, so those assignments
|
||
# are gated on value shape (_looks_like_opaque_credential).
|
||
_STRONG_KEY_KEYWORD_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"(?:api|auth|access|refresh|session|id|bearer)[ _.\\-]?(?:key|token)"
|
||
r"|key[ _.\\-]?material|secret|passwd|password|pass|pw|credential|auth|bearer",
|
||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||
)
|
||
# Password-class keys mask any literal value; for other keys a value that starts like ``$HOME/...``,
|
||
# ``/usr/...`` or ``~/...`` references a variable or a path, not a credential, even under a strong key
|
||
# (``SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$HOME/.ssh/agent.sock``, ``DOCKER_AUTH_CONFIG=/home/u/.docker``).
|
||
_PASSWORD_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"passwd|password|pass|pw", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
# Anchored on both ends: the whole value must be a ``$VAR``/``${VAR}`` reference, a ``~/``
|
||
# path, or an absolute path — not merely a string whose FIRST character is one of those.
|
||
# A 40-char AWS secret key starts with '/' ~1 in 64 times and argon2/bcrypt digests always
|
||
# start with '$'; an unanchored class let those secrets skip every check below.
|
||
# Further ``$VAR`` interpolations may appear anywhere in the path (``/run/user/$UID/ssh``,
|
||
# ``$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/agent.$USER.sock``, ``$A:$B`` lists); crypt digests never parse as one
|
||
# because their ``$`` fields start with a digit or carry ``=``/``,``.
|
||
# A leading ``$(`` is a command substitution (``SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$(gpgconf --list-dirs
|
||
# agent-ssh-socket)``): the value token stops at whitespace, so only ``$(gpgconf`` is seen.
|
||
_SHELL_VAR_REF = r"\$(?:\{[A-Za-z_]\w*[^}]*\}|[A-Za-z_]\w*)"
|
||
_PATH_OR_VAR_VALUE_RE = re.compile(rf"^(?:{_SHELL_VAR_REF}|\$\(|~|/)(?:[\w./:-]|{_SHELL_VAR_REF})*$")
|
||
# ``$VAR`` / ``$(cmd`` are unambiguous references. A ``/``- or ``~``-led value is a path only
|
||
# while every segment reads like one: a 16+ char segment mixing case and digits with no ``.``
|
||
# (``/wJalrXUtnFEMIK7MDENG/bPxRf…``) is a secret that happens to start with a path character,
|
||
# whereas ``/home/u/.docker`` / ``~/.ssh/id_rsa`` / ``S.gpg-agent.ssh`` never clear that bar.
|
||
_OPAQUE_PATH_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"(?=[^.]*[a-z])(?=[^.]*[A-Z])(?=[^.]*[0-9])[^.]{16,}")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_word_start(s: str, i: int) -> bool:
|
||
"""True if position ``i`` in ``s`` begins a word (edge, non-letter before, camelCase/acronym boundary)."""
|
||
if i == 0:
|
||
return True
|
||
prev, cur = s[i - 1], s[i]
|
||
if not prev.isalpha() or (cur.isupper() and prev.islower()): # clientSecret
|
||
return True
|
||
return cur.isupper() and prev.isupper() and i + 1 < len(s) and s[i + 1].islower() # APIToken
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_word_end(s: str, j: int, *, allow_plural: bool = True) -> bool:
|
||
"""True if position ``j`` (exclusive end) in ``s`` ends a word; one trailing ``s`` is absorbed."""
|
||
if j >= len(s):
|
||
return True
|
||
cur = s[j]
|
||
if not cur.isalpha() or (cur.isupper() and s[j - 1].islower()): # secretKey
|
||
return True
|
||
return allow_plural and cur in "sS" and _is_word_end(s, j + 1, allow_plural=False)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _has_word_bounded_keyword(key: str, keyword_re: re.Pattern[str]) -> bool:
|
||
"""True if ``keyword_re`` matches ``key`` at a word boundary (see _KEY_KEYWORD_RE)."""
|
||
return any(_is_word_start(key, m.start()) and _is_word_end(key, m.end()) for m in keyword_re.finditer(key))
|
||
|
||
|
||
_PASSWORD_WORD_RE = re.compile(r"passwd|password", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _has_password_keyword(key: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""``password``/``passwd`` ending a word, wherever it starts: no prose word ends in them, so
|
||
concatenated keys (``dbpassword``, ``rootpasswd``) are credentials, while ``passwordless``
|
||
is not. Requiring a word START too passed ``dbpassword: <v>`` through in clear."""
|
||
return any(_is_word_end(key, m.end()) for m in _PASSWORD_WORD_RE.finditer(key))
|
||
|
||
|
||
# Tool-defined env names that glue the keyword onto a prefix with no separator, so the
|
||
# word-boundary test can never see it: libpq's ``PGPASSWORD``, MySQL's ``MYSQL_PWD`` (bare
|
||
# ``PWD`` is the shell's working directory, so only this exact name), sshpass's ``SSHPASS``.
|
||
_GLUED_CREDENTIAL_ENV_RE = re.compile(r"PGPASSWORD|MYSQL_PWD|SSHPASS", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_glued_credential_env(key: str) -> bool:
|
||
return _GLUED_CREDENTIAL_ENV_RE.fullmatch(key.strip("\"'")) is not None
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _key_has_secret_keyword(key: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""Post-match key validator: ``API_KEY``/``DB_PW`` count, ``KEYBOARD``/``secretary`` do not."""
|
||
return (_has_word_bounded_keyword(key, _KEY_KEYWORD_RE) or _has_password_keyword(key)
|
||
or _is_glued_credential_env(key))
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _looks_like_opaque_credential(value: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""Credential-like shape test for ambiguous ``token``/``key`` values, so short
|
||
technical scalars (``CPU``, ``local``) are not masked merely for their key name."""
|
||
if value == "***" or value.startswith("«redacted:"):
|
||
return True
|
||
if len(value) >= 16 and re.fullmatch(r"[A-Fa-f0-9]+", value):
|
||
return True
|
||
if len(value) >= 20 and re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]+", value):
|
||
return True
|
||
if len(value) < 12:
|
||
return False
|
||
return sum(bool(re.search(p, value)) for p in (r"[a-z]", r"[A-Z]", r"[0-9]")) >= 2
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _should_redact_assignment(key: str, value: str, *, check_keyword: bool) -> bool:
|
||
"""Shared gate for the ENV / JSON / YAML assignment passes: skip programmatic env
|
||
lookups used as values, optionally require a word-bounded keyword in the key,
|
||
then redact when the key is unambiguously credential-bearing or the value looks opaque."""
|
||
# Programmatic env lookups reference variable *names*, not secret values — masking them corrupts code
|
||
# snippets in prose/log contexts (issue #2852): ``KEY=os.getenv('X')``.
|
||
# Same programmatic-env-lookup exception as _redact_env above (issue #2852): "apiKey": "os.getenv('X')"
|
||
# is a code snippet, not a leaked secret value.
|
||
# Same programmatic-env-lookup exception as _redact_env above (issue #2852): api_key: os.getenv('X') is
|
||
# a code snippet, not a leaked secret value.
|
||
if _ENV_LOOKUP_VALUE_RE.match(value):
|
||
return False
|
||
# An earlier pass already masked this value (``***`` or the ``«redacted:…»`` sentinel). Masking it
|
||
# again only erases what the sentinel deliberately kept — the vendor label (``Digest ***`` →
|
||
# ``***``, ``«redacted:ghp_…»`` → ``«redacted-secret»``). Same guard _redact_python_repr_fields uses.
|
||
if value == "***" or value.startswith("«redacted"):
|
||
return False
|
||
if check_keyword and not _key_has_secret_keyword(key):
|
||
return False
|
||
# A shell rc's ``SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$HOME/.ssh/agent.sock`` is configuration the agent must keep
|
||
# readable; only password-class keys mask a path/variable reference.
|
||
password_key = _has_word_bounded_keyword(key, _PASSWORD_KEY_RE) or _has_password_keyword(key)
|
||
if _PATH_OR_VAR_VALUE_RE.match(value) and not password_key:
|
||
# ``$VAR`` is an unambiguous reference. A bare ``/...`` or ``~...`` is not:
|
||
# ``/home/u/.docker`` and ``/8f3kd9sKd0als...`` have the same shape, so every
|
||
# segment has to look like a path (see _OPAQUE_PATH_SEGMENT_RE) before the
|
||
# value is treated as configuration.
|
||
if value[0] == "$" or not any(_OPAQUE_PATH_SEGMENT_RE.fullmatch(seg) for seg in value.split("/")):
|
||
return False
|
||
# ``signing_key`` / ``privateKey`` are credentials at any length, the same policy
|
||
# is_secret_field_name applies to mappings, so JSON text and dicts agree.
|
||
return (password_key or _has_word_bounded_keyword(key, _STRONG_KEY_KEYWORD_RE)
|
||
or _is_glued_credential_env(key)
|
||
or (_is_qualified_key_name(key) and not _CONFIG_PLACEHOLDER_VALUE_RE.fullmatch(value))
|
||
or _looks_like_opaque_credential(value))
|
||
|
||
|
||
# JSON field patterns: "apiKey": "value", "token": "value", etc.
|
||
# ``key``-suffixed credential names (``aws_secret_access_key``, ``SECRET_KEY``,
|
||
# ``privateKey``, ``signing_key``) and kubeconfig's ``client-key-data`` (a base64 PEM).
|
||
# The bare word ``key`` stays out: it names cache keys and model limits. A qualifier
|
||
# word has to sit in front of it, which is what the alternation spells out.
|
||
_KEY_QUALIFIED_NAME = (
|
||
r"[\w.\-]*(?:secret|private|signing|encryption|encrypt|master|hmac|symmetric|access)"
|
||
r"[_.\-]?(?:key|Key|KEY)"
|
||
)
|
||
_JSON_KEY_NAMES = (
|
||
r"(?:api_?[Kk]ey|token|secret|password|pgpassword|mysql_pwd|sshpass|access_token|refresh_token|auth_token|bearer"
|
||
r"|secret_value|raw_secret|secret_input|key_material|client[_.\-]?key[_.\-]?data"
|
||
rf"|{_KEY_QUALIFIED_NAME})"
|
||
)
|
||
_JSON_FIELD_RE = re.compile(rf'("{_JSON_KEY_NAMES}")\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"', re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
# The same field inside a JSON-encoded string (``{"output": "{\\"api_key\\": \\"…\\"}"}``): every tool result
|
||
# that wraps a config dump in JSON escapes the quotes, so the rule above never saw the value (#115104).
|
||
# The backreference keeps the key's and value's escape depth equal.
|
||
_JSON_FIELD_ESCAPED_RE = re.compile(rf'((\\+)"{_JSON_KEY_NAMES}\2")\s*:\s*\2"([^"\\]+)\2"', re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
# Any other identifier-shaped key (``"API_TOKEN"``, ``"DB_PASSWORD"``, ``"client_secret"``): the closed
|
||
# list above misses affixed names that the ENV and YAML passes already accept (#147240). The callback
|
||
# applies the YAML pass's word set at a word boundary, then the shared assignment gate.
|
||
# The value may carry JSON escapes (``"s3cret\\value"``): ``\\.`` consumes each escape pair whole.
|
||
_JSON_ANY_KEY_FIELD_RE = re.compile(r'("([A-Za-z0-9_.\-]{1,128}+)")\s*+:\s*+"((?:[^"\\\n]|\\.)++)"')
|
||
# The same field inside a JSON-encoded string (``{"output": "{\\"DB_PASSWORD\\": \\"…\\"}"}``),
|
||
# like _JSON_FIELD_ESCAPED_RE does for the closed key list: group 2 is the escape run.
|
||
_JSON_ANY_KEY_FIELD_ESCAPED_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r'((\\++)"([A-Za-z0-9_.\-]{1,128}+)\2")\s*+:\s*+\2"([^"\\\n]++)\2"')
|
||
_JSON_KEY_NAMES_FULL_RE = re.compile(_JSON_KEY_NAMES, re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
# Python ``repr`` uses single-quoted mapping fields, so opaque credentials in
|
||
# tracebacks and pytest failure introspection bypass the double-quoted JSON rule
|
||
# above: ``{'BRAVE_API_KEY': 'opaque-value'}``. Capture identifier-shaped keys
|
||
# here, then apply the canonical high-confidence key policy in the callback.
|
||
_PYTHON_REPR_SECRET_KEYS = frozenset({
|
||
"access_token",
|
||
"refresh_token",
|
||
"id_token",
|
||
"auth_token",
|
||
"token",
|
||
"api_key",
|
||
"apikey",
|
||
"client_secret",
|
||
"secret",
|
||
"password",
|
||
"passwd",
|
||
"private_key",
|
||
"credential",
|
||
"credentials",
|
||
"authorization",
|
||
"bearer",
|
||
"secret_value",
|
||
"raw_secret",
|
||
"secret_input",
|
||
"key_material",
|
||
})
|
||
_PYTHON_REPR_ENV_SUFFIXES = (
|
||
"_API_KEY",
|
||
"_TOKEN",
|
||
"_SECRET",
|
||
"_PASSWORD",
|
||
"_PASSWD",
|
||
"_CREDENTIAL",
|
||
"_CREDENTIALS",
|
||
)
|
||
# Casefolded credential suffixes for mixed/camel-case key names
|
||
# (``UserPassword``, ``sessionToken``, ``clientApiKey``). Suffix-only so
|
||
# ``token_count`` / ``password_policy`` metadata keys never match. Widened per
|
||
# OpenHands/software-agent-sdk#4508.
|
||
_PYTHON_REPR_CREDENTIAL_SUFFIXES = (
|
||
"apikey",
|
||
"api_key",
|
||
"token",
|
||
"secret",
|
||
"password",
|
||
"passwd",
|
||
"credential",
|
||
"credentials",
|
||
)
|
||
_PYTHON_REPR_FIELD_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"'(?P<key>[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)'(?P<sep>\s*:\s*)"
|
||
r"(?:"
|
||
r"(?P<single_prefix>[bB]?)'(?P<single_value>(?:\\.|[^'\\])+)'"
|
||
r"|(?P<double_prefix>[bB]?)\"(?P<double_value>(?:\\.|[^\"\\])+)\""
|
||
r")"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# Terminal/process output normally uses ``code_file=True`` to preserve source.
|
||
# Add repr masking only to high-confidence diagnostic lines: pytest assertion
|
||
# introspection (``E ...``) and final Python exception lines.
|
||
_PYTEST_DIAGNOSTIC_LINE_RE = re.compile(r"^(?P<prefix>[ \t]*E[ \t]{2,})(?P<body>.*)$")
|
||
_PYTHON_EXCEPTION_LINE_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"^(?P<prefix>(?:[A-Za-z_]\w*\.)*[A-Za-z_]\w*"
|
||
r"(?:Error|Exception|Warning):[ \t]*)(?P<body>.*)$"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# Authorization / Proxy-Authorization, any scheme or bare credential; header
|
||
# name and scheme word preserved. The credential class excludes quotes: pulling
|
||
# a closing quote into the mask turns value corruption into SYNTAX corruption
|
||
# (unterminated quote → shell EOF / SyntaxError).
|
||
_AUTH_HEADER_RE = re.compile(r"((?:Proxy-)?Authorization:\s*)([A-Za-z][\w.+-]*\s+)?([^\s\"']+)", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
# API-key style headers (single opaque value, no scheme word): non-vendor-prefix
|
||
# values would otherwise leak when a curl command is echoed into tool output.
|
||
SECRET_HEADER_NAME_LIST = ("x-api-key", "x-goog-api-key", "api-key", "apikey", "x-api-token", "x-auth-token", "x-access-token")
|
||
_SECRET_HEADER_NAMES = rf"(?:{'|'.join(SECRET_HEADER_NAME_LIST)})"
|
||
_SECRET_HEADER_RE = re.compile(rf"({_SECRET_HEADER_NAMES}\s*:\s*)(\S+)", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
# Telegram bot tokens: [bot]<digits>:<token>, token >= 30 chars. The lookbehind
|
||
# anchors the id at the start of its digit run: without it, a long run of digits
|
||
# with no ":<token>" after it (a Unity/YAML ``_typelessdata`` blob in a 2 MB PR
|
||
# diff, hex/decimal dumps) retried the greedy ``\d{8,}`` from every digit —
|
||
# quadratic, one core at 100% for hours while holding the GIL.
|
||
_TELEGRAM_RE = re.compile(r"(?<!\d)(bot)?(\d{8,}):([-A-Za-z0-9_]{30,})")
|
||
|
||
_PRIVATE_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----")
|
||
# A base64-encoded PEM private key: kubeconfig's ``client-key-data`` and the ``*_b64``
|
||
# fields around it (``kubectl config view --raw``, cloud-init, CI secrets). The name is
|
||
# not reliable — kubeconfig writes ``client-key-data`` in YAML and JSON alike, and the
|
||
# terminal path deliberately skips the assignment passes on source-shaped output — so the
|
||
# rule keys on the payload: base64 that decodes to a ``BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY`` header.
|
||
_B64_PEM_RE = re.compile(r"LS0tLS1CRUdJTi[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{60,}")
|
||
# Private-key formats that are not PEM. All three reach the model on their own: PGP's
|
||
# armour carries a \` BLOCK\` suffix so the PEM pattern never matched it, PuTTY's .ppk is
|
||
# base64 under a \`Private-Lines:\` header (the usual SSH key format on Windows), and age
|
||
# writes a bech32 AGE-SECRET-KEY-1… string.
|
||
_PGP_PRIVATE_KEY_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----[\s\S]*?-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----"
|
||
)
|
||
# Line ends may be CRLF (Windows writes .ppk that way) or a JSON-escaped ``\\n``.
|
||
_PPK_EOL = r"(?:\r?\n|\\r\\n|\\n)"
|
||
# Body lines may carry read_file's `` 4|`` line-number gutter.
|
||
_PPK_BODY_GUTTER = r"[ \t]*+(?:[0-9]++(?:[|:]|\t)[ \t]*+)?"
|
||
_PUTTY_PRIVATE_LINES_RE = re.compile(
|
||
rf"(?<![\w-])(Private-Lines:[ \t]*+[0-9]++[ \t]*+(?P<eol>{_PPK_EOL}))"
|
||
rf"(?:{_PPK_BODY_GUTTER}[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{{16,}}+[ \t]*+{_PPK_EOL}?)++"
|
||
)
|
||
_AGE_SECRET_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"AGE-SECRET-KEY-1[0-9A-Z]{20,}")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_b64_pem_key(blob: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""True when ``blob`` is base64 of a PEM private key block."""
|
||
import base64
|
||
import binascii
|
||
|
||
padded = blob + "=" * (-len(blob) % 4)
|
||
try:
|
||
decoded = base64.b64decode(padded, validate=False)
|
||
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
|
||
return False
|
||
text = decoded[:64]
|
||
return text.startswith(b"-----BEGIN") and b"PRIVATE KEY" in text
|
||
|
||
|
||
# Database connection strings: protocol://user:PASSWORD@host. The userinfo and
|
||
# password groups forbid whitespace so a match can never span a line break (a
|
||
# greedy ``[^@]+`` once ran to a decorator's ``@`` on the next code line).
|
||
# Database connection strings: protocol://user:PASSWORD@host Catches postgres, mysql, mongodb, redis, amqp
|
||
# URLs and redacts the password. A real DSN password never contains whitespace; without this bound the
|
||
# greedy [^@]+ would scan past the end of a code line to the next stray "@" (e.g. a Python decorator),
|
||
# swallowing intervening lines and corrupting tool OUTPUT for any source containing a postgresql:// f-string
|
||
# template. See issue #33801.
|
||
_DB_CONNSTR_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"((?:postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?|rediss?|amqps?)://[^:\s]*+:)((?:[^@\s:]++|:(?!//))++)(@)",
|
||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# Bare-token URL credential ``scheme://TOKEN@host`` (``git remote set-url
|
||
# https://PASSWORD@github.com/...``): unambiguously a secret, since round-trip
|
||
# URLs (OAuth callbacks, magic links) carry tokens in the QUERY STRING, never
|
||
# bare userinfo. ``user:pass@`` passes through (class forbids ``:``); DB schemes
|
||
# belong to _DB_CONNSTR_RE. 8+ char floor skips short usernames; the class
|
||
# forbids ``/`` so an ``@`` in a path/query (``?q=user@example.com``) never counts.
|
||
# This is the ``git remote set-url origin https://PASSWORD@github.com/...`` shape from issue #6396 — a
|
||
# single opaque credential in the userinfo position with NO ``user:pass`` colon. The colon form's
|
||
# PASSWORD is masked separately by _redact_userinfo_passwords (issue #125664) — #34029's pass-through
|
||
# was about query-string round-trip tokens (magic links / OAuth callbacks / pre-signed URLs live in
|
||
# the query, never in userinfo), and a userinfo password is a credential, not a workflow token. DB
|
||
# schemes are handled by _DB_CONNSTR_RE above and excluded here. Guards against false positives:
|
||
_URL_BARE_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"((?:https?|wss?|git|ssh|ftp|ftps|sftp)://)" # scheme
|
||
r"([^\s:@/]{8,})" # bare token (no colon/slash/@), 8+ chars
|
||
r"(@[^\s]+)", # @host...
|
||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# JWTs always start with "eyJ" (base64 "{"); 1-, 2- and 3-part forms.
|
||
_JWT_RE = re.compile(r"eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]{4,}){0,2}")
|
||
|
||
# Links ``hermes webapp`` prints that sign a browser in as the user: the gateway's browser credential
|
||
# after ``hermes-session=`` and the one-use ticket of a ``/webapp/launch`` link. Both values are
|
||
# URL-safe base64 (43 characters); the 20-character floor leaves placeholders and code (``${token}``).
|
||
_WEBAPP_LINK_CREDENTIAL_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"((?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])hermes-session=|/webapp/launch#(?:[^\s#]*?&)?ticket=)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}")
|
||
|
||
# E.164 phone numbers, 7-15 digits; the lookahead rejects hex strings / identifiers.
|
||
_SIGNAL_PHONE_RE = re.compile(r"(\+[1-9]\d{6,14})(?![A-Za-z0-9])")
|
||
|
||
# CDP-URL path: web URLs with a query string / with ``user:password@`` userinfo
|
||
# (DB protocols are covered by _DB_CONNSTR_RE).
|
||
_URL_WITH_QUERY_RE = re.compile(r"(https?|wss?|ftp)://([^\s/?#]+)([^\s?#]*)\?([^\s#]+)(#\S*)?")
|
||
_URL_USERINFO_RE = re.compile(r"(https?|wss?|ftp)://([^/\s:@]+):([^/\s@]+)@")
|
||
|
||
# Strict provider-egress URL redaction: delimiters stay in capture groups so the
|
||
# query/fragment layout is preserved byte-for-byte; the key is decoded
|
||
# separately for classification. Values stop at ``&``/``;`` (both valid).
|
||
_STRICT_URL_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r"([?#&;])([A-Za-z0-9_.~+%\-]+)=([^#&;\s\"'<>]*)")
|
||
|
||
# Userinfo in absolute and network-path (``//user:pass@host``) references; the
|
||
# authority stops at path/query/fragment delimiters. Anchored on the mandatory
|
||
# ``//`` — an optional-scheme prefix backtracked O(n²) on long alphanumeric runs
|
||
# (~55s per sub() on a 320KB compaction payload).
|
||
_STRICT_URL_USERINFO_RE = re.compile(r"//[^/\s?#@]+@")
|
||
# The same authority span with the delimiter and userinfo captured, for _redact_userinfo_passwords.
|
||
_URL_USERINFO_PAIR_RE = re.compile(r"(//)([^/\s?#@]+)@")
|
||
|
||
# ``NAME=user:pass`` where NAME carries no secret keyword — an HTTP Basic auth pair is often stored
|
||
# this way (#125664). Shape-only on arbitrary names, so it runs force-only (persistence boundary,
|
||
# debug dumps, session export all pass force=True): ordinary prose/config keeps today's behaviour.
|
||
# Guards against non-secret colon values: the password needs an 8-char floor AND a letter (ports and
|
||
# digit-only tags fail it), the password group is a single token (no whitespace, quotes or ``/`` —
|
||
# so ``registry.example.com:5000/repo`` keeps its path, and an ISO timestamp's ``:00:00`` tail
|
||
# truncates the group to digits), and a version-shaped tail (``24.04-noble``, ``v1.2.3-alpine``)
|
||
# is rejected outright. The value is the WHOLE assignment (``user`` cannot contain ``:``/``@``/``/``),
|
||
# and the ``:(?!//)`` lookahead keeps ``scheme://`` values (``MY_URL=https://example.com``) out.
|
||
# ``user`` must also be at least 2 characters: a single-letter ``user:`` is a Windows drive
|
||
# (``SRC=C:\Users\...``), and masking the whole path as ``SRC=C:***`` at a force boundary is
|
||
# unrecoverable data loss — no real Basic pair has a one-letter user, and a secret-keyword NAME
|
||
# still masks via the ENV pass (#125680 review).
|
||
# ``@`` is not a password character here either: a ``user:pass@host``-shaped value belongs to the
|
||
# userinfo pass below, which knows the f-string ``{...}`` template exemption; excluding it lets that
|
||
# pass see the pure brace expression (``BASIC="user:{pw}@host"`` keeps its template verbatim).
|
||
_BASIC_PAIR_ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.\-])([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.\-]{0,63})=([\"']?)"
|
||
r"([A-Za-z0-9._~\-]{2,})(?::(?!//)([^\s'\"/:@]+))\2(?![^\s;,&|)\]}\"'`])"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# ``24.04-noble`` / ``v1.2.3-alpine`` image tags: digit-led dotted versions, optionally ``v``-prefixed
|
||
# — long and letter-bearing enough to pass the floor, yet never a credential.
|
||
_VERSION_TAG_RE = re.compile(r"^[vV]?\d+(\.\d+)+")
|
||
# ``nginx:stable-alpine`` / ``myrepo:latest-release``: lower-case words joined by ``-``/``.``
|
||
# are image tags and labels; a password carries a digit, a capital or a symbol.
|
||
_WORD_TAG_RE = re.compile(r"[a-z]++(?:[.\-][a-z]++)*+")
|
||
|
||
# ``CHECKSUM=sha256:1234…`` digest labels: the hex body is long and letter-bearing, but a hash
|
||
# algorithm name as the ``user`` half marks the pair as an algorithm:digest, not a credential
|
||
# (#125680 review). No real Basic pair has one of these as its username.
|
||
_HASH_ALGO_NAMES = frozenset({
|
||
"md5", "sha1", "sha224", "sha256", "sha384", "sha512", "sha3-224", "sha3-256",
|
||
"sha3-384", "sha3-512", "blake2b", "blake2s", "ripemd160", "crc32", "crc32c",
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
# ``NAME=user:pass`` is only a Basic pair when NAME says it holds one: ``IMAGE=redis:7-alpine``,
|
||
# ``BRANCH=origin:feature2``, ``LS_COLORS=...:mh=00:...`` and ``Server=tcp:db,1433`` are colon
|
||
# values under names that never carry credentials (#149435 review).
|
||
_BASIC_PAIR_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"auth|basic|cred|login|proxy|userpass|userinfo", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_basic_pair_password(password: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""8+ chars with a letter and not a version-shaped tail — a secret, not a tag or timestamp."""
|
||
if _VERSION_TAG_RE.search(password) or _WORD_TAG_RE.fullmatch(password):
|
||
return False
|
||
return len(password) >= 8 and any(c.isalpha() for c in password)
|
||
|
||
# Form-urlencoded body: only when the ENTIRE text is a k=v&k=v string.
|
||
_FORM_BODY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*=[^&\s]*(?:&[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*=[^&\s]*)+$")
|
||
|
||
# Control / zero-width characters that can split a token body (``sk-abc\x1bdef``,
|
||
# ``ghp_abc\n123``) and escape the contiguous prefix regexes.
|
||
_CONTROL_CHARS_RE = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f\u200b-\u200f\u2028-\u202f\u2060\ufeff]")
|
||
|
||
# Union of every _PREFIX_PATTERNS body class: a control-stripped match may only
|
||
# span token-body or control chars. ``=`` is excluded so a KEY=value separator
|
||
# never lets a match span unrelated text.
|
||
_TOKEN_BODY_CHARS = frozenset("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_-.")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _compile_prefix_matcher(patterns: list) -> re.Pattern[str]:
|
||
return re.compile(r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])(" + "|".join(patterns) + r")(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _compile_prefix_sub_matcher(patterns: list) -> re.Pattern[str]:
|
||
"""_PREFIX_RE for the masking pass, also admitting a key glued to an identifier by ``-``/``_``
|
||
(``backup-sk-…``, ``x-ghp_…``), which _PREFIX_RE rejects so ``scikit-learn`` stays whole. One
|
||
fixed-width lookbehind keeps main's single scan; _mask_prefix_match masks a glued match only
|
||
when its body is opaque, so ``backup-sk-learn`` stays whole too (#147240)."""
|
||
# Branches grouped by their literal first char (every pattern opens on one, see
|
||
# register_redaction_patterns): admitting ``-``/``_`` before a key makes every separator a
|
||
# candidate, and a flat 60-way alternation per candidate doubled the cost of a ``_ghp_`` flood.
|
||
# Groups are disjoint by first char, so leftmost-first match order is unchanged.
|
||
by_first: dict = {}
|
||
for pattern in patterns:
|
||
by_first.setdefault(pattern[0], []).append(pattern[1:])
|
||
body = "|".join(f"{re.escape(c)}(?:{'|'.join(rest)})" for c, rest in by_first.items())
|
||
return re.compile(r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9])(" + body + r")(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])")
|
||
|
||
|
||
_PREFIX_RE = _compile_prefix_matcher(_PREFIX_PATTERNS)
|
||
_PREFIX_SUB_RE = _compile_prefix_sub_matcher(_PREFIX_PATTERNS)
|
||
# A real key body has a 16+ char run with no separator mixing two of lower/upper/digit;
|
||
# ``sk-prod-deployment-01`` and ``fc-feature-flags-v2`` do not.
|
||
_LONG_ALNUM_RUN_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}+")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_opaque_prefixed_token(token: str) -> bool:
|
||
for run in _LONG_ALNUM_RUN_RE.finditer(token):
|
||
run = run.group(0)
|
||
if (run.isalpha() and (run.islower() or run.isupper())) or run.isdigit():
|
||
continue
|
||
return True
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _mask_prefix_match(m: "re.Match[str]", mask) -> str:
|
||
glued = m.start() > 0 and m.string[m.start() - 1] in "-_"
|
||
return m.group(0) if glued and not _is_opaque_prefixed_token(m.group(1)) else mask(m.group(1))
|
||
|
||
# Zhipu API keys use an unprefixed ``id.secret`` form. Keep this deliberately
|
||
# provider-shaped instead of applying a generic high-entropy dotted-token rule:
|
||
# the ID is exactly 32 lowercase hex chars and the credential suffix is a run of
|
||
# at least 16 alphanumerics, so content-hash filenames (``<sha>.bundle``,
|
||
# ``<md5>.sqlite3``) never match.
|
||
_ZHIPU_API_KEY_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.-])([0-9a-f]{32}\.[A-Za-z0-9]{16,})(?![A-Za-z0-9_.-])"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _mask_control_split_tokens(text: str, mask_fn) -> str:
|
||
"""Mask tokens whose body is split by control/zero-width characters.
|
||
|
||
Match on a control-stripped copy, then mask the corresponding span in the
|
||
ORIGINAL — only when that span holds solely token-body and control chars, so
|
||
a match can never cross into another line's unrelated text.
|
||
|
||
A credential like ``sk-abc\\x1bdef456…`` or ``ghp_abc\\n123def…`` has its token body interrupted, so the
|
||
contiguous _PREFIX_RE cannot match it and the secret leaks verbatim (issue #77484). ``EXA_API_KEY=*** is
|
||
rejected).
|
||
"""
|
||
stripped = _CONTROL_CHARS_RE.sub("", text)
|
||
if stripped == text:
|
||
return text
|
||
orig_idx = [i for i, c in enumerate(text) if not _CONTROL_CHARS_RE.match(c)]
|
||
out, matches = list(text), []
|
||
for m in _PREFIX_RE.finditer(stripped):
|
||
start_orig = orig_idx[m.start(1)]
|
||
end_orig = orig_idx[m.end(1) - 1] + 1
|
||
span = text[start_orig:end_orig]
|
||
# Self-matching fragment AND a span crossing a LINE boundary: do NOT join
|
||
# (``ghp_<tok>\nbutton`` would mask ``button``; the prefix pass handles the
|
||
# fragment). Non-newline controls (ESC, ZWSP) never legitimately sit
|
||
# between a token and prose, so there the join proceeds regardless.
|
||
if ("\n" in span or "\r" in span) and _PREFIX_RE.search(span):
|
||
continue
|
||
# Reject spans containing a non-token char (``sk_abc…\nTAVILY_API_KEY=``
|
||
# matched across lines) and matches running into a ``KEY=`` name.
|
||
if (all(c in _TOKEN_BODY_CHARS or _CONTROL_CHARS_RE.match(c) for c in span)
|
||
and (end_orig >= len(text) or text[end_orig] != "=")):
|
||
matches.append((start_orig, end_orig, mask_fn(m.group(1))))
|
||
for start_orig, end_orig, replacement in reversed(matches):
|
||
out[start_orig:end_orig] = list(replacement)
|
||
return "".join(out)
|
||
|
||
|
||
# mask_secret strips EVERY control char (incl. \n/\t, C1, DEL, zero-width) so a
|
||
# masked secret never emits multiline or invisible bytes into display output.
|
||
_DISPLAY_CONTROL_RE = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f\x80-\x9f\u200b-\u200f\u202a-\u202e\u2060-\u2064]")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def mask_secret(value: str, *, head: int = 4, tail: int = 4, floor: int = 12,
|
||
placeholder: str = "***", empty: str = "") -> str:
|
||
"""Mask a secret for display (``hermes config`` / ``status`` / ``dump``):
|
||
``sk-p...7890``; shorter than ``floor`` (after control-byte stripping) →
|
||
``placeholder``; falsy → ``empty``."""
|
||
value = _DISPLAY_CONTROL_RE.sub("", value) if value else value
|
||
if not value:
|
||
return empty
|
||
return placeholder if len(value) < floor else f"{value[:head]}...{value[-tail:]}"
|
||
|
||
|
||
# Approval-prompt display integrity: the copy a human approves must show everything that will run.
|
||
# Code points that render as nothing or as a line break become visible escapes: every control,
|
||
# format, private-use, unassigned and surrogate code point (category C*, except tab/newline), line
|
||
# and paragraph separators (Zl/Zp), and blank-rendering marks/letters in other categories (variation
|
||
# selectors incl. U+E0100-E01EF, CGJ, Khmer/Mongolian selectors, Hangul fillers, Braille blank).
|
||
# Ordinary non-ASCII text is untouched. Padding that pushes the tail off screen or past a preview
|
||
# cut (space runs, whitespace-only lines) collapses to a marker; real indentation is kept.
|
||
_APPROVAL_NON_ASCII_RE = re.compile(r"[^\x20-\x7e\t\n]+")
|
||
_APPROVAL_BLANK_GLYPHS = frozenset(
|
||
"\u034f\u115f\u1160\u17b4\u17b5\u180b\u180c\u180d\u180f\u2800\u3164\uffa0"
|
||
+ "".join(map(chr, range(0xFE00, 0xFE10))) + "".join(map(chr, range(0xE0100, 0xE01F0))))
|
||
_APPROVAL_SPACE = r"[ \t\u00a0\u1680\u2000-\u200a\u202f\u205f\u3000]"
|
||
# Mid-line runs (after visible text) of 21+, or line-leading runs past any sane indentation.
|
||
_APPROVAL_PAD_RE = re.compile(rf"(?<=\S){_APPROVAL_SPACE}{{21,}}|(?m:^){_APPROVAL_SPACE}{{65,}}")
|
||
# 3+ consecutive blank or whitespace-only lines; the match ends at a newline so the next line keeps its indent.
|
||
_APPROVAL_BLANK_RE = re.compile(rf"\n(?:{_APPROVAL_SPACE}*\n){{3,}}")
|
||
_APPROVAL_SAME_CHAR_RUN_RE = re.compile(r"(.)\1*", re.DOTALL)
|
||
# Prose mode (questions shown to a human, never executed) surfaces only what can hide or reorder
|
||
# text: controls, bidi embeddings/overrides/isolates, line/paragraph separators and padding. ZWJ,
|
||
# ZWNJ and variation selectors stay, because emoji and scripts such as Persian need them.
|
||
_PROSE_BIDI_CONTROLS = frozenset("\u202a\u202b\u202c\u202d\u202e\u2066\u2067\u2068\u2069")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _escape_approval_run(run: str, prose: bool = False) -> str:
|
||
"""Escape the invisible code points of a non-ASCII run; 4+ repeats of one show once with their count."""
|
||
def one(m: re.Match) -> str:
|
||
ch, n = m.group(1), len(m.group())
|
||
cat = unicodedata.category(ch)
|
||
if prose:
|
||
hidden = cat == "Cc" or cat in ("Zl", "Zp") or ch in _PROSE_BIDI_CONTROLS
|
||
else:
|
||
hidden = ch in _APPROVAL_BLANK_GLYPHS or cat[0] == "C" or cat in ("Zl", "Zp")
|
||
if not hidden:
|
||
return m.group()
|
||
esc = ch.encode("unicode_escape").decode("ascii")
|
||
return f"⟨{esc} ×{n}⟩" if n >= 4 else esc * n
|
||
return _APPROVAL_SAME_CHAR_RUN_RE.sub(one, run)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def sanitize_command_for_display(text: str | None, *, prose: bool = False) -> str:
|
||
"""Make hidden content in an approval-prompt string visible; clean text comes back unchanged.
|
||
|
||
Display-only: the executed command, smart assessment and allowlist keys never see this copy.
|
||
``prose=True`` is the lighter pass for question text (see ``_PROSE_BIDI_CONTROLS``)."""
|
||
if not text:
|
||
return ""
|
||
out = _APPROVAL_NON_ASCII_RE.sub(lambda m: _escape_approval_run(m.group(), prose), text)
|
||
out = _APPROVAL_BLANK_RE.sub(lambda m: f"\n⟨+{m.group().count(chr(10)) - 1} blank lines⟩\n", out)
|
||
return _APPROVAL_PAD_RE.sub(lambda m: f" ⟨+{len(m.group())} whitespace chars⟩ ", out)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def redact_approval_display(text: str | None, *, force: bool = False, prose: bool = False) -> str:
|
||
"""Secret redaction plus :func:`sanitize_command_for_display`, for every approval surface."""
|
||
return sanitize_command_for_display(redact_sensitive_text(str(text or ""), force=force), prose=prose)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _mask_token(token: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Mask a log token — 18-char floor, preserves 6 prefix / 4 suffix; empty → ``***``."""
|
||
if not token:
|
||
return "***"
|
||
return mask_secret(token, head=6, tail=4, floor=18)
|
||
|
||
|
||
# Output of an earlier pass: masking it again would erase the kind it keeps visible. Only a
|
||
# value that IS a marker is skipped; ``***MyRealPass9`` or ``"«redacted:ghp_…» tail"`` still
|
||
# carries cleartext. An unquoted ``[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]`` reaches here cut at its space.
|
||
_REDACTION_MARKER_RE = re.compile(r"\*{3}|«redacted(?::[^»\s]*|-secret)»|\[REDACTED(?: PRIVATE KEY\])?")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_redaction_marker(match: "re.Match[str]", value: str) -> bool:
|
||
if value == "[REDACTED":
|
||
return match.string.startswith(" PRIVATE KEY]", match.end("value"))
|
||
return _REDACTION_MARKER_RE.fullmatch(value) is not None
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _mask_flag_value(match: "re.Match[str]", mask=None) -> str:
|
||
"""Mask the value of a flag/connection-string key, keeping the flag and any quotes.
|
||
|
||
``mask`` is the caller's mask function: ``file_read`` passes the non-reusable sentinel,
|
||
so a file read never hands back a head/tail value shaped like a usable key (#35519)."""
|
||
value = match.group("value")
|
||
stripped = value.strip("'\"")
|
||
if not stripped or _is_redaction_marker(match, stripped.strip()):
|
||
return match.group(0)
|
||
# ``--password=$DB_PASS`` / ``--token=${TOKEN}`` name a variable; the reference is
|
||
# not the credential and masking it would make the command unreplayable.
|
||
if stripped[0] in "$<{%":
|
||
return match.group(0)
|
||
if stripped.isdigit():
|
||
return match.group(0) # ``--token 60`` is a timeout, not a credential
|
||
if match.re is _CLI_SECRET_FLAG_RE:
|
||
if "=" not in match.group("sep") and _is_flag_placeholder(value):
|
||
return match.group(0)
|
||
if _is_flag_path_reference(match.group("flag"), stripped):
|
||
return match.group(0)
|
||
masked = (mask or _mask_token)(stripped)
|
||
start = match.start("value") - match.start(0)
|
||
end = match.end("value") - match.start(0)
|
||
return match.group(0)[:start] + masked + match.group(0)[end:]
|
||
|
||
|
||
# A space-separated flag is followed by whatever comes next, which in ``--help`` output and
|
||
# prose is a placeholder or a word (``--token TOKEN``, ``[--password PASSWORD]``, ``use
|
||
# --token to pass…``), the next flag (``psql --password -h db``) or a sub-option spec
|
||
# (``docker build --secret id=npmrc``). None of those is the credential.
|
||
# A metavar is upper case (``TOKEN``, ``DB_PASSWORD``), two short snake-case words
|
||
# (``db_name``) or a one-hump camelCase type name (cobra's ``stringArray``); a prose word
|
||
# is short and lower case. A passphrase is longer than that: a long lower-case word
|
||
# (``correcthorsebatterystaple``), three or more words (``correct_horse_battery_staple``,
|
||
# ``correctHorseBatteryStaple``) or anything carrying a digit or symbol is still masked.
|
||
_FLAG_PLACEHOLDER_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"(?:[A-Z][A-Z_]*|[a-z]{1,8}|[a-z]{1,8}_[a-z]{1,8}|[a-z]{1,8}[A-Z][a-z]{1,8})[\]).,:;]*"
|
||
r"|[-\[(<].*|[a-z][\w-]*=.*"
|
||
r"|\S*(?:xxx|XXX|\.\.\.)" # a docs sample: ``--api-key sk-or-v1-xxx``
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_flag_placeholder(value: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""True for an unquoted space-separated flag value that is a word, not a credential."""
|
||
return value[0] not in "'\"" and _FLAG_PLACEHOLDER_RE.fullmatch(value) is not None
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_flag_path_reference(flag: str, value: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""``--credentials ~/.config/gcloud/creds.json`` names a file, same rule as the ENV passes:
|
||
only password-class flags mask a path, and only while no segment looks opaque."""
|
||
if _PASSWORD_KEY_RE.search(flag) or not value.startswith(("/", "~", "./", "../")):
|
||
return False
|
||
return not any(_OPAQUE_PATH_SEGMENT_RE.fullmatch(seg) for seg in value.split("/"))
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_cli_secrets(text: str, mask=None) -> str:
|
||
"""Mask credentials written as command-line flags and connection-string keys."""
|
||
def sub(m: "re.Match[str]") -> str:
|
||
return _mask_flag_value(m, mask)
|
||
|
||
if "=" in text or " " in text:
|
||
if _CLI_SECRET_FLAG_GATE.search(text):
|
||
text = _CLI_SECRET_FLAG_RE.sub(sub, text)
|
||
if _CLI_LOGIN_GATE.search(text):
|
||
text = _CLI_LOGIN_P_RE.sub(sub, text)
|
||
if _CONNSTR_GATE.search(text):
|
||
text = _CONNSTR_SECRET_KEY_RE.sub(sub, text)
|
||
return text
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_private_key_blocks(text: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Whole private-key blocks (PEM, base64 PEM, PGP, PuTTY, age). Runs before the
|
||
flag/connection-string passes: those stop a value at whitespace, so masking
|
||
``AccountKey=-----BEGIN`` first would break the PEM header and leave the body visible."""
|
||
if "-----BEGIN" in text and "-----END" in text: # no END, no match: skip the quadratic scan
|
||
text = _PRIVATE_KEY_RE.sub("[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]", text)
|
||
if "LS0tLS1CRUdJTi" in text:
|
||
text = _B64_PEM_RE.sub(
|
||
lambda m: "[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]" if _is_b64_pem_key(m.group(0)) else m.group(0),
|
||
text,
|
||
)
|
||
if "END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK" in text: # no END, no match: skip the quadratic scan
|
||
text = _PGP_PRIVATE_KEY_RE.sub("[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]", text)
|
||
if "Private-Lines:" in text:
|
||
text = _PUTTY_PRIVATE_LINES_RE.sub(
|
||
lambda m: m.group(1) + "[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]" + m.group("eol"), text
|
||
)
|
||
if "AGE-SECRET-KEY-1" in text:
|
||
text = _AGE_SECRET_KEY_RE.sub("[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]", text)
|
||
return text
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_python_repr_secret_key(key: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""Return True for exact secret keys or credential-suffixed key names."""
|
||
folded = key.casefold()
|
||
if folded in _PYTHON_REPR_SECRET_KEYS:
|
||
return True
|
||
if key.isupper() and key.endswith(_PYTHON_REPR_ENV_SUFFIXES):
|
||
return True
|
||
# Mixed/camel-case keys ending in a credential word (``UserPassword``,
|
||
# ``sessionToken``, ``clientApiKey``) — the exact-set and uppercase-suffix
|
||
# rules above miss these. Suffix-only matching keeps metadata names like
|
||
# ``TOKEN_COUNT`` / ``PASSWORD_POLICY`` / ``SECRET_NAME`` untouched.
|
||
# Class widened per OpenHands/software-agent-sdk#4508 (their dict-entry
|
||
# redaction was uppercase-only and leaked mixed-case keys).
|
||
if folded.endswith(_PYTHON_REPR_CREDENTIAL_SUFFIXES):
|
||
return True
|
||
# Names ending in ``key`` where a qualifier says which kind of key it is:
|
||
# ``aws_secret_access_key``, ``SECRET_KEY``, ``privateKey``, ``signing_key``,
|
||
# ``encryption_key``, ``master_key``, ``hmac_key``. A bare ``key``, ``public_key``,
|
||
# ``hotkey`` and ``key_id`` stay untouched — they name cache keys, limits and ids.
|
||
return _is_qualified_key_name(key)
|
||
|
||
|
||
# A qualified key masks short values too, except a sample or switch that cannot be the
|
||
# credential: ``{"encryptKey": "true"}``, ``master_key: default``, ``"<your key>"``. Only a
|
||
# word-shaped bracket is a docs sample; ``<hunter2>`` / ``<Abc9!xyz>`` are still masked.
|
||
_CONFIG_PLACEHOLDER_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
|
||
r"<[a-z]+(?:[ _-][a-z]+)+>|<(?:key|token|secret|password|value)>|true|false|yes|no|null|none|default",
|
||
re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
_KEY_SECRET_QUALIFIERS = frozenset({
|
||
"secret", "private", "signing", "encryption", "encrypt", "master", "hmac",
|
||
"symmetric", "access",
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _key_name_words(key: str) -> list[str]:
|
||
"""Split a field name into lower-case words: ``aws_secret_access_key`` and
|
||
``awsSecretAccessKey`` both give ``[aws, secret, access, key]``."""
|
||
spaced = re.sub(r"(?<=[a-z0-9])(?=[A-Z])", "_", key)
|
||
return [w for w in re.split(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]+", spaced.lower()) if w]
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_qualified_key_name(key: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""True for a ``…key`` field name whose qualifier makes it a credential.
|
||
|
||
``access`` is in the qualifier set because AWS pairs an access-key id with the
|
||
secret that signs with it, and the id alone still identifies an account; it is
|
||
never a value safe to print in a chat approval card.
|
||
"""
|
||
words = _key_name_words(key)
|
||
if len(words) < 2 or words[-1] != "key":
|
||
return False
|
||
return any(w in _KEY_SECRET_QUALIFIERS for w in words[:-1])
|
||
|
||
|
||
def is_secret_field_name(key: object) -> bool:
|
||
"""True when a mapping field named ``key`` holds a credential — the repr-field policy, for callers
|
||
that mask structured config by field instead of by text."""
|
||
return isinstance(key, str) and _is_python_repr_secret_key(key)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_python_repr_fields(text: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Fully mask credential fields in Python mapping ``repr`` output."""
|
||
def _sub(match: re.Match) -> str:
|
||
key = match.group("key")
|
||
if not _is_python_repr_secret_key(key):
|
||
return match.group(0)
|
||
|
||
single_value = match.group("single_value")
|
||
if single_value is not None:
|
||
prefix = match.group("single_prefix") or ""
|
||
quote = "'"
|
||
value = single_value
|
||
else:
|
||
prefix = match.group("double_prefix") or ""
|
||
quote = '"'
|
||
value = match.group("double_value")
|
||
|
||
# Mapping repr can contain code-shaped fixture values too. Preserve
|
||
# programmatic env lookups just like the ENV/JSON/YAML passes do.
|
||
if _ENV_LOOKUP_VALUE_RE.match(value):
|
||
return match.group(0)
|
||
# An upstream pass (MCP probe header scrub, _mask_token) already masked this
|
||
# value; re-masking would erase the scheme word it deliberately kept
|
||
# (``'Authorization': 'Digest ***'`` → ``'***'``).
|
||
if "***" in value or value.startswith("«redacted:"):
|
||
return match.group(0)
|
||
# Do not retain head/tail characters here: escaped repr atoms can cross
|
||
# a slicing boundary and leave an unescaped quote behind. A full mask is
|
||
# parseable for both str and bytes values and leaks no opaque bytes.
|
||
return f"'{key}'{match.group('sep')}{prefix}{quote}***{quote}"
|
||
|
||
return _PYTHON_REPR_FIELD_RE.sub(_sub, text)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_python_diagnostic_repr_fields(text: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Mask repr fields only on pytest/error lines in source-preserving output."""
|
||
lines = text.splitlines(keepends=True)
|
||
for index, line in enumerate(lines):
|
||
ending = ""
|
||
body_line = line
|
||
if line.endswith("\r\n"):
|
||
body_line, ending = line[:-2], "\r\n"
|
||
elif line.endswith("\n") or line.endswith("\r"):
|
||
body_line, ending = line[:-1], line[-1:]
|
||
|
||
match = _PYTEST_DIAGNOSTIC_LINE_RE.match(body_line)
|
||
if match is None:
|
||
match = _PYTHON_EXCEPTION_LINE_RE.match(body_line)
|
||
if match is not None:
|
||
lines[index] = (
|
||
match.group("prefix")
|
||
+ _redact_python_repr_fields(match.group("body"))
|
||
+ ending
|
||
)
|
||
return "".join(lines)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_query_string(query: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Replace values of sensitive ``k=v&k=v`` params with ``***``; others pass through."""
|
||
if not query:
|
||
return query
|
||
return "&".join(
|
||
f"{key}=***" if sep and key.lower() in _SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMS else pair
|
||
for pair in query.split("&") for key, sep, _ in (pair.partition("="),)
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _canonical_url_param_name(name: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Decode a URL parameter name (up to 3 unquote rounds) for case-insensitive matching."""
|
||
decoded = name
|
||
for _ in range(3):
|
||
next_value = unquote_plus(decoded)
|
||
if next_value == decoded:
|
||
break
|
||
decoded = next_value
|
||
folded = decoded.casefold()
|
||
# Preserve policy names that are canonically hyphenated (for example
|
||
# x-amz-signature) before accepting underscore-normalized aliases.
|
||
return folded if folded in _SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMS else folded.replace("-", "_")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_strict_url_credentials(text: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Strict egress-boundary redaction of URL credentials (absolute, relative and
|
||
network references); preserves keys, separators, public params, hosts, paths."""
|
||
text = _STRICT_URL_PARAM_RE.sub(
|
||
lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}{m.group(2)}=***"
|
||
if _canonical_url_param_name(m.group(2)) in _SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMS else m.group(0), text)
|
||
return _STRICT_URL_USERINFO_RE.sub("//***:***@", text)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def redact_cdp_url(value: object) -> str:
|
||
"""Mask secrets in a CDP/browser endpoint URL before it is logged.
|
||
|
||
Unlike ``redact_sensitive_text`` (which passes web-URL query params and
|
||
``user:pass@`` through for OAuth callbacks / magic links), CDP discovery
|
||
tokens are pure credentials, so this opts INTO both URL redactors.
|
||
"""
|
||
text = redact_sensitive_text("" if value is None else str(value))
|
||
if not text:
|
||
return text
|
||
text = _URL_WITH_QUERY_RE.sub(
|
||
lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}://{m.group(2)}{m.group(3)}?{_redact_query_string(m.group(4))}{m.group(5) or ''}",
|
||
text,
|
||
)
|
||
return _URL_USERINFO_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}://{m.group(2)}:***@", text)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_form_body(text: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Redact sensitive values when the ENTIRE text is a clean ``k=v&k=v`` body."""
|
||
if not text or "\n" in text or "&" not in text or not _FORM_BODY_RE.match(text.strip()):
|
||
return text
|
||
return _redact_query_string(text.strip())
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _mask_token_nonreusable(token: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Redact a prefix-matched credential to a NON-REUSABLE sentinel: no head/tail
|
||
chars (an agent once wrote a truncated-looking mask back into a config file),
|
||
only the vendor prefix label so the credential KIND stays visible.
|
||
|
||
* cannot be mistaken for a usable-but-truncated key, so an agent that reads it from a config file and
|
||
writes it back does NOT corrupt the stored credential into a dead 13-char string (issue #35519); and *
|
||
still does not leak the secret material (no head/tail chars).
|
||
"""
|
||
label = next((sub for sub in _PREFIX_SUBSTRINGS if token.startswith(sub)), "") if token else ""
|
||
return f"«redacted:{label}…»" if label else "«redacted-secret»"
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _assignment_sub(render, *, check_keyword: bool):
|
||
"""re.sub callback: keep the match unless the key/value pair (groups[0], groups[-1]) needs redaction."""
|
||
def _sub(m):
|
||
groups = m.groups()
|
||
if not _should_redact_assignment(groups[0], groups[-1], check_keyword=check_keyword):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
return render(groups)
|
||
return _sub
|
||
|
||
|
||
_JSON_FLAG_VALUES = frozenset({"true", "false", "yes", "no", "null", "none"})
|
||
_JSON_VALUE_SUFFIX_RE = re.compile(r"[_.\-]?(?:value|Value|VALUE)$")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _json_affixed_key_secret(key: str, value: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""Whether ``"key": "value"`` holds a credential under an affixed secret-word key (#147240)."""
|
||
if _JSON_KEY_NAMES_FULL_RE.fullmatch(key): # the closed-list pass already decided this field
|
||
return False
|
||
if not (_has_word_bounded_keyword(key, _YAML_CFG_WORD_RE) or _has_password_keyword(key)):
|
||
return False
|
||
if _DSN_PW_PLACEHOLDER_RE.fullmatch(value) or not _should_redact_assignment(key, value, check_keyword=True):
|
||
return False
|
||
# A key that does not END in the credential word is metadata about one: ``passwordChanged``,
|
||
# ``password_expires_at``, ``tokenUrl``, ``secret_id``, ``secret_arn``, ``PASSWORD_STORE_DIR``
|
||
# carry timestamps, URLs and ids that look opaque, so the value shape cannot decide (#149435
|
||
# review). A boolean answers ``has_password``, it does not hold one.
|
||
# ``api_key_value`` / ``passwordValue`` hold the credential itself: drop that one suffix first.
|
||
return _is_python_repr_secret_key(_JSON_VALUE_SUFFIX_RE.sub("", key)) and value.casefold() not in _JSON_FLAG_VALUES
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_json_affixed_key(m: "re.Match[str]", mask) -> str:
|
||
if not _json_affixed_key_secret(m.group(2), m.group(3)):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
return f'{m.group(1)}: "{mask(m.group(3))}"'
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_json_affixed_key_escaped(m: "re.Match[str]", mask) -> str:
|
||
if not _json_affixed_key_secret(m.group(3), m.group(4)):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
return f'{m.group(1)}: {m.group(2)}"{mask(m.group(4))}{m.group(2)}"'
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_assignments(text: str, *, mask_nonreusable: bool = False) -> str:
|
||
"""ENV / config / JSON / YAML assignment passes (skipped for code files). Passes
|
||
that would match ``token=``/``key=`` URL params skip ``://`` text (web-URL query
|
||
params are intentionally passed through, see redact_sensitive_text).
|
||
|
||
``mask_nonreusable`` masks the assignments with the ``«redacted:…»`` sentinel that
|
||
``file_read=True`` already uses for prefix-matched credentials. Without it an agent
|
||
that read a secret-bearing file would hold a head/tail mask shaped like a real but
|
||
truncated key and could write it back as a dead credential (#35519)."""
|
||
mask = _mask_token_nonreusable if mask_nonreusable else _mask_token
|
||
if "=" in text:
|
||
_redact_env = _assignment_sub(lambda g: f"{g[0]}={g[1]}{mask(g[2])}{g[1]}", check_keyword=True)
|
||
text = _ENV_ASSIGN_RE.sub(_redact_env, text)
|
||
if "://" not in text: # lowercase names would match URL params
|
||
# Skip URLs — the query string may contain ``token=``/``key=`` params that are intentionally
|
||
# passed through (see note near the bottom of this function; _redact_strict_url_credentials
|
||
# handles the opt-in case). The uppercase regex above is all-caps-only, so it never matches URL
|
||
# params; the lowercase one would (issue #77484).
|
||
text = _ENV_ASSIGN_LOWER_RE.sub(_redact_env, text)
|
||
# The keyword pre-gate is exact and matters: _CFG_DOTTED_RE backtracks
|
||
# quadratically on long unbroken [A-Za-z0-9_.\-] runs.
|
||
# Lowercase/dotted config keys (issue #16413). Skip URLs entirely — web-URL query params are
|
||
# intentionally passed through (see note near the bottom of this function); _DB_CONNSTR_RE still
|
||
# guards connection-string passwords. Extra gate: every _CFG_*_RE match requires a secret keyword in
|
||
# the key, so a text without any secret keyword cannot match — skipping is exact. This matters
|
||
# because _CFG_DOTTED_RE backtracks quadratically on long unbroken [A-Za-z0-9_.\-] runs (e.g.
|
||
# base64/hex blobs in compaction payloads); the linear keyword scan prevents that pathological path
|
||
# on secret-free text.
|
||
if "://" not in text and _CFG_SECRET_WORD_RE.search(text):
|
||
text = _CFG_DOTTED_RE.sub(_redact_env, text)
|
||
text = _CFG_ANCHORED_RE.sub(_redact_env, text)
|
||
|
||
if ":" in text and '"' in text:
|
||
text = _JSON_FIELD_RE.sub(
|
||
_assignment_sub(lambda g: f'{g[0]}: "{mask(g[1])}"', check_keyword=False), text)
|
||
if '\\"' in text:
|
||
text = _JSON_FIELD_ESCAPED_RE.sub(
|
||
_assignment_sub(lambda g: f'{g[0]}: {g[1]}"{mask(g[2])}{g[1]}"', check_keyword=False), text)
|
||
text = _JSON_ANY_KEY_FIELD_RE.sub(lambda m: _redact_json_affixed_key(m, mask), text)
|
||
if '\\"' in text:
|
||
text = _JSON_ANY_KEY_FIELD_ESCAPED_RE.sub(lambda m: _redact_json_affixed_key_escaped(m, mask), text)
|
||
|
||
# Python mapping repr fields ({'API_KEY': '…'}): single-quoted, so the JSON rule
|
||
# above never sees them — the traceback / pytest-introspection leak shape.
|
||
if ":" in text and "'" in text:
|
||
text = _redact_python_repr_fields(text)
|
||
|
||
# YAML after JSON; unwrap scalars before the shared assignment gate so
|
||
# quoted programmatic env lookups retain the same exemption as bare ones.
|
||
if ":" in text and "://" not in text:
|
||
def _redact_yaml(m):
|
||
key, sep, value = m.groups()
|
||
quote = value[0] if len(value) >= 2 and value[0] in "\"'" and value[-1] == value[0] else ""
|
||
inner = value[1:-1] if quote else value
|
||
# An empty or docs-placeholder scalar (``""``, ``"<your key>"``, ``"${API_KEY}"``) is not
|
||
# a credential; masking it hides what the config expects, as _redact_db already rules.
|
||
if quote and (not inner or _DSN_PW_PLACEHOLDER_RE.fullmatch(inner)
|
||
or (inner.startswith("{{") and inner.endswith("}}"))): # Helm/Jinja template
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
if not _should_redact_assignment(key, inner, check_keyword=True):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
return f"{key}{sep}{quote}{mask(inner)}{quote}"
|
||
text = _YAML_ASSIGN_RE.sub(_redact_yaml, text)
|
||
return text
|
||
|
||
|
||
# A docs placeholder is a lower-case or ALL-CAPS name in angle brackets (``<password>``) or an
|
||
# upper-case env var reference (``${REDIS_PASSWORD}``); ``$ecretPassw0rd`` or ``<Zq8x…>`` is
|
||
# a real password that happens to start with the same character.
|
||
_DSN_PW_PLACEHOLDER_RE = re.compile(r"<(?:[a-z][a-z_ -]*|[A-Z][A-Z_ -]*)>|\$\{?[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*\}?")
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ``https://user:password@host`` in docs names the field instead of filling it in.
|
||
_USERINFO_PLACEHOLDER_WORDS = frozenset({"password", "passwd", "pass", "pw", "pwd", "secret", "token"})
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_userinfo_placeholder(password: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""A template (``{pw}``, ``{{ pw }}``), docs placeholder or field name, never a literal secret."""
|
||
return ((password.startswith("{") and password.endswith("}"))
|
||
or _DSN_PW_PLACEHOLDER_RE.fullmatch(password) is not None
|
||
or password.casefold() in _USERINFO_PLACEHOLDER_WORDS)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_userinfo_passwords(text: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Mask the password half of ``scheme://user:pass@host`` userinfo (#125664).
|
||
|
||
#34029's pass-through was about query-string round-trip tokens (magic links, OAuth callbacks,
|
||
pre-signed URLs live in the query, never in userinfo); the userinfo password is a credential —
|
||
the same reasoning #6396 used to mask the bare-token form. Keeps scheme, username and host
|
||
visible. Templates and docs samples (``{pw}``, ``${TOKEN}``, ``password``) stay as written."""
|
||
def _sub(m):
|
||
user, sep, password = m.group(2).partition(":")
|
||
# f-string / Jinja templates and docs samples (``user:{pw}@``, ``user:${TOKEN}@``,
|
||
# ``user:password@``) in prose and logs as much as in code files.
|
||
if not sep or not password or _is_userinfo_placeholder(password):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
return f"{m.group(1)}{user}:***@"
|
||
return _URL_USERINFO_PAIR_RE.sub(_sub, text)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_url_credentials(text: str, code_file: bool) -> str:
|
||
"""DB connection-string passwords, bare-token and ``user:pass`` URL userinfo (``://`` text only)."""
|
||
def _redact_db(m):
|
||
# code_file: a pure ``{...}`` password is an f-string template reference
|
||
# (f"postgresql://{user}:{pass}@{host}"), not a literal credential.
|
||
pw = m.group(2)
|
||
if code_file and pw.startswith("{") and pw.endswith("}"):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
# Password-only URLs in docs: ``redis://:<password>@`` / ``redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@``.
|
||
if m.group(1).endswith("://:") and _DSN_PW_PLACEHOLDER_RE.fullmatch(pw):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
return f"{m.group(1)}***{m.group(3)}"
|
||
text = _DB_CONNSTR_RE.sub(_redact_db, text)
|
||
text = _URL_BARE_TOKEN_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}{_mask_token(m.group(2))}{m.group(3)}", text)
|
||
return _redact_userinfo_passwords(text)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _redact_phone(m):
|
||
phone = m.group(1)
|
||
keep = 2 if len(phone) <= 8 else 4
|
||
return phone[:keep] + "****" + phone[-keep:]
|
||
|
||
|
||
def redact_sensitive_text(text: str, *, force: bool = False, code_file: bool = False,
|
||
file_read: bool = False, secret_file: bool = False,
|
||
redact_url_credentials: bool = False) -> str:
|
||
"""Apply all redaction patterns to a block of text.
|
||
|
||
Safe on any string. Enabled by default (``security.redact_secrets: false``
|
||
disables); ``force=True`` is for safety boundaries that must never return
|
||
raw secrets regardless.
|
||
|
||
``redact_url_credentials=True``: also redact credential-named query params
|
||
and the entire URL userinfo (``***:***@``) — off by default because OAuth-callback /
|
||
magic-link / pre-signed URLs must survive ordinary tool flows unchanged.
|
||
``code_file=True``: skip the ENV/JSON assignment passes for known source
|
||
code (``MAX_TOKENS=***``, ``"apiKey": "test"`` fixtures). ``file_read=True``
|
||
(implies code_file unless ``secret_file``): prefix-matched credentials become a
|
||
non-reusable sentinel (``«redacted:ghp_…»``) instead of a head/tail mask an agent
|
||
could write back into config.yaml as a dead credential.
|
||
Every regex sits behind a cheap substring gate that its pattern requires,
|
||
so the gates are never false-negative.
|
||
|
||
Set code_file=True to also skip the Python-repr mapping pass (``{'API_KEY': '…'}``
|
||
fixtures in source); pytest/exception diagnostic lines get a narrow pass in
|
||
redact_terminal_output instead.
|
||
|
||
Set file_read=True for file *content* returned to the agent (read_file / search_files / cat). The old
|
||
mask looked like a real-but-truncated key, so an agent reading it from config.yaml and writing it back
|
||
silently corrupted the stored credential into a dead 13-char value → 401 (issue #35519). The sentinel is
|
||
syntactically invalid as a token, so it can't be mistaken for a usable key or written back as one.
|
||
|
||
Set ``secret_file=True`` when the caller has already classified the SOURCE as secret-bearing
|
||
(``_is_secret_file_arg``: command reads on the terminal side, resolved tool paths on the
|
||
file side). It re-enables the ENV/JSON/YAML assignment passes that ``file_read`` would
|
||
otherwise skip, so an opaque prefix-less credential assigned to a credential-shaped key is
|
||
masked instead of passed through in cleartext (issue #110567). With ``file_read=True`` those
|
||
assignments are masked with the non-reusable sentinel, so the #35519 write-back hazard stays
|
||
closed. ``secret_file`` is authoritative: it wins over ``code_file``, so a caller cannot be
|
||
fail-open by setting both. Files that are not secret-bearing (any source file, a project's own
|
||
``config.yaml``) keep the code_file behaviour: ``MAX_TOKENS: 100`` and ``"apiKey": "test"``
|
||
fixtures are untouched.
|
||
"""
|
||
if text is None:
|
||
return None
|
||
text = text if isinstance(text, str) else str(text)
|
||
if not text:
|
||
return text
|
||
# Vault secrets are a hard model-egress boundary: scrubbed regardless of the redact_secrets preference.
|
||
text = redact_registered_vault_values(text)
|
||
if not (force or _redact_enabled()):
|
||
return text
|
||
# ``secret_file`` is authoritative: a caller that classified the source as secret-bearing must not
|
||
# be silently fail-open because another flag (code_file, or file_read implying it) was also set.
|
||
code_file = (code_file or file_read) and not secret_file
|
||
|
||
# Control/zero-width chars can split a token body so _PREFIX_RE alone misses it.
|
||
if _has_known_prefix_substring(text):
|
||
_prefix_sub = _mask_token_nonreusable if file_read else _mask_token
|
||
# Control/zero-width chars (\\n, \\r, ESC, U+200B, …) split a token body so _PREFIX_RE cannot match
|
||
# across them — a secret smuggled as ``sk-abc\\x1bdef…`` leaks verbatim (issue #77484). Mask such
|
||
# runs by first matching on a control-stripped copy, then re-masking the corresponding span in the
|
||
# original (the stripped copy and the original are aligned 1:1 for non-control chars).
|
||
text = _mask_control_split_tokens(text, _prefix_sub)
|
||
text = _PREFIX_SUB_RE.sub(lambda m: _mask_prefix_match(m, _prefix_sub), text)
|
||
|
||
if "." in text:
|
||
_zhipu_sub = _mask_token_nonreusable if file_read else _mask_token
|
||
text = _ZHIPU_API_KEY_RE.sub(lambda m: _zhipu_sub(m.group(1)), text)
|
||
|
||
if not code_file:
|
||
text = _redact_assignments(text, mask_nonreusable=file_read)
|
||
|
||
# Flags and connection-string keys carry a credential in command text, so they are not
|
||
# gated on code_file: the shape (``--password=`` / ``;AccountKey=``) is unambiguous, and
|
||
# the surfaces that leaked them (approval cards, chat status) run this pass anyway.
|
||
text = _redact_private_key_blocks(text)
|
||
text = _redact_cli_secrets(text, _mask_token_nonreusable if file_read else None)
|
||
|
||
if force and "=" in text:
|
||
# ``NAME=user:pass`` under an innocuous name (#125664): shape-only, so force-only — every
|
||
# force=True caller (persistence boundary, debug dumps, session export) is a safety boundary
|
||
# that must not return raw secrets; ordinary flows keep today's pass-through.
|
||
def _basic_pair(m):
|
||
password = m.group(4)
|
||
if password is None or not _BASIC_PAIR_NAME_RE.search(m.group(1)) \
|
||
or not _is_basic_pair_password(password):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
# ``CHECKSUM=sha256:<hex>``: an algorithm:digest label, not a user:credential pair.
|
||
if m.group(3).lower() in _HASH_ALGO_NAMES:
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
# A template or docs placeholder, not a literal credential — the rule
|
||
# _redact_userinfo_passwords applies below.
|
||
if _is_userinfo_placeholder(password):
|
||
return m.group(0)
|
||
return f"{m.group(1)}={m.group(2)}{m.group(3)}:***{m.group(2)}"
|
||
text = _BASIC_PAIR_ASSIGN_RE.sub(_basic_pair, text)
|
||
|
||
if "uthorization" in text or "UTHORIZATION" in text: # cheapest gate over every casing
|
||
text = _AUTH_HEADER_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + (m.group(2) or "") + _mask_token(m.group(3)), text)
|
||
|
||
if ":" in text:
|
||
text = _SECRET_HEADER_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + _mask_token(m.group(2)), text)
|
||
text = _TELEGRAM_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1) or ''}{m.group(2)}:***", text)
|
||
|
||
# Database connection string passwords. With code_file=True, a password group that is a pure ``{...}``
|
||
# brace expression is an f-string template reference (e.g. f"postgresql://{user}:{pass}@{host}"), not a
|
||
# literal credential — preserve it. Literal passwords are still redacted. The regex forbids whitespace
|
||
# in the password group, so a single-line template's group(2) is exactly the brace expression. See issue
|
||
# #33801.
|
||
if "://" in text:
|
||
text = _redact_url_credentials(text, code_file)
|
||
|
||
# Keyword/value connection strings (``Host=…;Password=…``, libpq ``host=… password=…``):
|
||
# the forms the URL pass above never sees. Gate: a ``password=``/``pwd=`` key in any casing;
|
||
# the per-line companion-key check in _redact_kv_connection_strings keeps prose out.
|
||
if _KV_CONNSTR_GATE_RE.search(text):
|
||
text = _redact_kv_connection_strings(text, code_file)
|
||
|
||
if "eyJ" in text:
|
||
text = _JWT_RE.sub(lambda m: _mask_token(m.group(0)), text)
|
||
|
||
# A Webapp sign-in link signs a browser in as the user, so its credential is masked whatever the
|
||
# web-URL policy below.
|
||
if "hermes-session=" in text or "/webapp/launch#" in text:
|
||
text = _WEBAPP_LINK_CREDENTIAL_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + "***", text)
|
||
|
||
if redact_url_credentials: # opt-in; known credential shapes in URLs are caught above
|
||
# NOTE: Web-URL redaction (query params + userinfo + HTTP access-log request targets) is
|
||
# intentionally OFF. Many legitimate workflows pass opaque tokens through query strings — magic-link
|
||
# checkouts, OAuth callbacks the agent is meant to follow, pre-signed share URLs — and
|
||
# blanket-redacting param values by name breaks those skills mid-flow. DB connection-string
|
||
# passwords are still caught by _DB_CONNSTR_RE. The ONE userinfo case still redacted is the
|
||
# colon-less bare-token form ``scheme://TOKEN@host`` (#6396, handled by _URL_BARE_TOKEN_RE in the
|
||
# ``://`` block above): a bare credential in userinfo is never a round-trip workflow token (those
|
||
# live in the query string), so masking it can't break a skill. The ``user:pass@`` form is left to
|
||
# pass through per #34029.
|
||
text = _redact_strict_url_credentials(text)
|
||
|
||
if "&" in text and "=" in text:
|
||
text = _redact_form_body(text)
|
||
|
||
if "+" in text:
|
||
text = _SIGNAL_PHONE_RE.sub(_redact_phone, text)
|
||
|
||
return text
|
||
|
||
|
||
# Commands whose stdout is an env-var dump: terminal redaction runs the
|
||
# ENV-assignment pass (code_file=False) for these so opaque tokens with no vendor
|
||
# prefix are masked; everything else uses code_file=True (``MAX_TOKENS=100``).
|
||
# Commands whose stdout is an environment-variable dump (KEY=value lines), NOT source code.
|
||
# ``MY_SERVICE_TOKEN=abc123randomstring``) are still masked. For all other commands, code_file=True is used
|
||
# to avoid mangling legitimate source/config dumps (``MAX_TOKENS=100``, ``"apiKey": "x"`` fixtures,
|
||
# ``postgresql://{user}`` f-string templates). See issue #43025.
|
||
_ENV_DUMP_COMMANDS = frozenset({"env", "printenv", "set", "export", "declare"})
|
||
|
||
# Commands that read file contents to stdout, plus the filter readers (``grep``/``awk``/``sed``)
|
||
# the model reaches for on config files. A secret-bearing target (``.env`` per AGENTS.md,
|
||
# a shell rc/profile, Hermes' own ``config.yaml`` where ``hermes mcp add --env`` writes
|
||
# tokens) is a credential dump, so the ENV/YAML assignment pass must run. Arbitrary
|
||
# ``config.yaml`` / source files stay on the code_file path (``MAX_TOKENS: 100``).
|
||
_FILE_READ_COMMANDS = frozenset({
|
||
"cat", "head", "tail", "type", "bat", "less", "more", "nl",
|
||
"zcat", "tac", "view", "batcat", "grep", "awk", "sed",
|
||
})
|
||
_SHELL_RC_BASENAMES = frozenset({
|
||
".bashrc", ".bash_profile", ".bash_login", ".profile",
|
||
".zshrc", ".zprofile", ".zlogin", ".zshenv",
|
||
})
|
||
# Filter readers take a PATTERN/program as their first positional; only the operands after
|
||
# it are files, so ``grep .bashrc app.py`` must not gate on the pattern.
|
||
_PATTERN_FIRST_COMMANDS = frozenset({"grep", "awk", "sed"})
|
||
_HERMES_HOME_PREFIXES = ("$HERMES_HOME/", "${HERMES_HOME}/")
|
||
# ``$HOME/.hermes/config.yaml`` keeps the ``.hermes`` segment, so stripping the prefix is
|
||
# enough to gate it; ``~/`` already survives the ``$``-bearing-path bail-out.
|
||
_HOME_PREFIXES = ("$HOME/", "${HOME}/")
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _command_segments(command: str) -> list[str]:
|
||
"""Pipeline/sequence segments, split only on unquoted ``| ; &`` so an
|
||
``awk '{print $1; print $2}'`` program or ``grep 'foo|bar'`` pattern stays one
|
||
segment. Backslash is not an escape (Windows ``C:\\Users\\...``)."""
|
||
segments: list[str] = []
|
||
buf: list[str] = []
|
||
quote: str | None = None
|
||
for ch in command:
|
||
if quote:
|
||
buf.append(ch)
|
||
if ch == quote:
|
||
quote = None
|
||
continue
|
||
if ch in "'\"":
|
||
quote = ch
|
||
buf.append(ch)
|
||
continue
|
||
if ch in "|;&":
|
||
seg = "".join(buf).strip()
|
||
if seg:
|
||
segments.append(seg)
|
||
buf = []
|
||
continue
|
||
buf.append(ch)
|
||
seg = "".join(buf).strip()
|
||
if seg:
|
||
segments.append(seg)
|
||
return segments
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_under_hermes_home(path: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""True when an absolute ``config.yaml`` path sits under the active Hermes home or root.
|
||
|
||
The default home's basename is an installation detail — ``.hermes`` on POSIX, ``hermes``
|
||
under ``AppData/Local`` on Windows — and a resolved path never spells ``$HERMES_HOME``,
|
||
so the literal-segment test in ``_is_secret_file_arg`` cannot see a native Windows path.
|
||
Compare against the resolved homes instead. Only reached for a ``config.yaml`` basename,
|
||
so the resolve cost stays off the per-token command scan.
|
||
"""
|
||
from agent.file_safety import _hermes_dirs
|
||
|
||
try:
|
||
target = os.path.normcase(os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(path)))
|
||
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
||
return False
|
||
for home in _hermes_dirs():
|
||
try:
|
||
base = os.path.normcase(os.path.realpath(str(home)))
|
||
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
||
continue
|
||
if target == base or target.startswith(base + os.sep):
|
||
return True
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _is_secret_file_arg(arg: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""``.env``-style or shell rc basename anywhere; ``config.yaml`` only under a
|
||
``.hermes`` directory, ``$HERMES_HOME``, or the resolved Hermes home (never arbitrary
|
||
YAML). The resolved-home arm is what covers native Windows, where the home directory
|
||
is ``%LOCALAPPDATA%\\hermes`` and carries no ``.hermes`` segment."""
|
||
path = arg.strip("\"'").replace("\\", "/")
|
||
hermes_home = False
|
||
for prefix in _HERMES_HOME_PREFIXES:
|
||
if path.startswith(prefix):
|
||
path = path[len(prefix):]
|
||
hermes_home = True
|
||
break
|
||
for prefix in _HOME_PREFIXES:
|
||
if path.startswith(prefix):
|
||
path = path[len(prefix):]
|
||
break
|
||
if "$" in path:
|
||
return False
|
||
parts = [part.lower() for part in path.split("/") if part]
|
||
if not parts:
|
||
return False
|
||
if parts[-1] in _ENV_FILE_BASENAMES or parts[-1] in _SHELL_RC_BASENAMES:
|
||
return True
|
||
# ``config.yaml`` plus the ``config.yaml.good.<stamp>`` / ``.corrupt.<stamp>`` copies Hermes
|
||
# writes under ``backups/config/`` — same contents, same secrets.
|
||
if parts[-1] != "config.yaml" and not parts[-1].startswith(("config.yaml.good.", "config.yaml.corrupt.")):
|
||
return False
|
||
return hermes_home or ".hermes" in parts[:-1] or _is_under_hermes_home(path)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _command_reads_secret_file(command: str | None) -> bool:
|
||
"""True if ``command`` reads a secret-bearing file (see ``_is_secret_file_arg``) to
|
||
stdout. Defense-in-depth, not a boundary: indirect reads (``sudo cat .env``, ``$(cat
|
||
.env)``, unresolved variable paths) are not detected, matching ``is_env_dump_command``."""
|
||
if not command or not isinstance(command, str):
|
||
return False
|
||
for seg in _command_segments(command):
|
||
tokens = seg.split() # not shlex: it mangles Windows paths (``C:\Users\...\.env``)
|
||
if not tokens:
|
||
continue
|
||
reader = tokens[0].rsplit("/", 1)[-1].lower()
|
||
if reader not in _FILE_READ_COMMANDS:
|
||
continue
|
||
positional = [arg for arg in tokens[1:] if not arg.startswith("-")]
|
||
if reader in _PATTERN_FIRST_COMMANDS:
|
||
positional = positional[1:]
|
||
if any(_is_secret_file_arg(arg) for arg in positional):
|
||
return True
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
|
||
def is_env_dump_command(command: str | None) -> bool:
|
||
"""True if any pipeline/sequence segment starts with an _ENV_DUMP_COMMANDS
|
||
token. Conservative: unrecognized → False (callers fall back to code_file=True)."""
|
||
if not command or not isinstance(command, str):
|
||
return False
|
||
for seg in _command_segments(command):
|
||
try:
|
||
tokens = shlex.split(seg)
|
||
except ValueError:
|
||
tokens = seg.split()
|
||
if tokens and tokens[0] in _ENV_DUMP_COMMANDS:
|
||
return True
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
|
||
REDACTION_UNAVAILABLE = "[redaction-unavailable]"
|
||
# The opaque branch needs a 20-char floor (the floor the gateway/A2A sweeps always had): without it the
|
||
# English word "bearer" turns "the bearer of bad news" into "Bearer [redacted] bad news" on every chat
|
||
# reply. The bracket branch folds an already-masked residue ("Bearer [redacted-jwt]") to one marker.
|
||
_BEARER_RESIDUE_RE = re.compile(r"\bBearer\s+(?:\[[^\]]+\]|[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{20,}=*)", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def redact_for_egress(text: str) -> str:
|
||
"""The one scrub for text leaving the process for a remote reader (chat platforms, A2A peers,
|
||
telemetry). ``redact_sensitive_text(force=True)`` — the only secret-pattern list — plus a bearer
|
||
sweep, because a ``Bearer <opaque>`` value with no vendor prefix carries no shape the prefix
|
||
matcher can key on. Fails CLOSED: if the redactor raises, the raw text is never returned."""
|
||
text = str(text or "")
|
||
try:
|
||
text = redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True)
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
return REDACTION_UNAVAILABLE
|
||
if "earer" in text:
|
||
text = _BEARER_RESIDUE_RE.sub("Bearer [redacted]", text)
|
||
return text
|
||
|
||
|
||
def redact_terminal_output(output: str, command: str | None = None, *, force: bool = False) -> str:
|
||
"""Single redaction policy for ALL terminal-output surfaces: the ENV/YAML-assignment
|
||
pass runs only when ``command`` is an env dump or reads a secret-bearing file (``.env``,
|
||
shell rc, Hermes ``config.yaml``); otherwise code_file=True avoids false positives on
|
||
source/config dumps."""
|
||
if not output:
|
||
return output
|
||
code_file = not (is_env_dump_command(command) or _command_reads_secret_file(command))
|
||
redacted = redact_sensitive_text(output, force=force, code_file=code_file)
|
||
# Source-preserving output still gets the Python-repr pass on high-confidence
|
||
# diagnostic lines (pytest ``E `` introspection, final exception lines): that is
|
||
# where {'BRAVE_API_KEY': '…'} leaks, not in source dumps.
|
||
if code_file and (force or _redact_enabled()) and ":" in redacted and "'" in redacted:
|
||
redacted = _redact_python_diagnostic_repr_fields(redacted)
|
||
return redacted
|
||
|
||
|
||
# --- Prefix pre-screen: derived from _PREFIX_PATTERNS so a new prefix can't
|
||
# silently break the gate (every match contains its pattern's literal prefix).
|
||
|
||
def _extract_literal_prefix(pattern: str) -> str:
|
||
"""Leading literal chars of a regex (up to the first metacharacter)."""
|
||
meta = "[(\\.?*+|{^$"
|
||
for i, ch in enumerate(pattern):
|
||
if ch in meta:
|
||
return pattern[:i]
|
||
return pattern
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _skip_char_class(pattern: str, i: int) -> int:
|
||
"""Given ``pattern[i] == "["``, return the index just past the closing ``]``."""
|
||
i += 2 if pattern[i + 1:i + 2] == "]" else 1 # a leading "]" is literal
|
||
while i < len(pattern) and pattern[i] != "]":
|
||
i += 2 if pattern[i] == "\\" else 1
|
||
return i
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _unbounded_quantifier_follows(pattern: str, j: int) -> bool:
|
||
"""True if an open-ended quantifier (``*``, ``+``, ``{m,}``) starts at ``pattern[j]``."""
|
||
if j >= len(pattern):
|
||
return False
|
||
if pattern[j] in "*+":
|
||
return True
|
||
if pattern[j] == "{":
|
||
k = pattern.find("}", j)
|
||
body = pattern[j + 1:k] if k != -1 else ""
|
||
return body[:-1].isdigit() and body.endswith(",") # {m,} is open-ended; {m} / {m,n} bounded
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _pattern_structure(pattern: str) -> tuple[bool, bool]:
|
||
"""One scan → ``(has_top_level_alternation, has_nested_unbounded_repeat)``.
|
||
|
||
Top-level ``|`` defeats the literal-prefix guarantee (in ``ab|.*`` the prefix
|
||
binds only the first branch; ``ab(?:x|y)`` is fine). An unbounded quantifier
|
||
on a group containing one (``(a+)+``, ``(a{2,})+``) is the canonical ReDoS
|
||
shape. Structural only; overlapping branches (``(a|aa)+``) are not detected.
|
||
"""
|
||
top_level_alt = nested = False
|
||
contains_unbounded = [False] # per open group: does it contain an unbounded repeat?
|
||
i = 0
|
||
while i < len(pattern):
|
||
ch = pattern[i]
|
||
if ch == "\\":
|
||
i += 2
|
||
continue
|
||
if ch == "[":
|
||
i = _skip_char_class(pattern, i)
|
||
elif ch == "(":
|
||
contains_unbounded.append(False)
|
||
elif ch == ")":
|
||
inner = contains_unbounded.pop() if len(contains_unbounded) > 1 else False
|
||
if inner and _unbounded_quantifier_follows(pattern, i + 1):
|
||
nested = True
|
||
contains_unbounded[-1] = contains_unbounded[-1] or inner
|
||
elif ch == "|" and len(contains_unbounded) == 1:
|
||
top_level_alt = True
|
||
elif _unbounded_quantifier_follows(pattern, i):
|
||
contains_unbounded[-1] = True
|
||
if ch == "{":
|
||
i = pattern.find("}", i) # skip the {m,} body
|
||
i += 1
|
||
return top_level_alt, nested
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _has_top_level_alternation(pattern: str) -> bool:
|
||
return _pattern_structure(pattern)[0]
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _has_nested_unbounded_repeat(pattern: str) -> bool:
|
||
return _pattern_structure(pattern)[1]
|
||
|
||
|
||
_PREFIX_SUBSTRINGS = tuple(_extract_literal_prefix(p) for p in _PREFIX_PATTERNS)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _has_known_prefix_substring(text: str) -> bool:
|
||
"""Cheap pre-check before the expensive ``_PREFIX_RE``."""
|
||
return any(p in text for p in _PREFIX_SUBSTRINGS)
|
||
|
||
|
||
# --- Plugin-registered redaction patterns -----------------------------------
|
||
# ADDITIVE-ONLY: a plugin can extend what gets masked but cannot weaken a
|
||
# built-in, so it can only over-redact. Keyed by registration source so plugin
|
||
# unload has a clean seam to drop ONE plugin's patterns.
|
||
# There is deliberately no public removal API — additive-only stands; unload is a host-owned lifecycle
|
||
# concern. See #64229.
|
||
_PLUGIN_PREFIX_PATTERNS: dict = {}
|
||
_registry_lock = threading.Lock()
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _plugin_patterns() -> list:
|
||
"""All plugin-registered patterns in registration order."""
|
||
return [p for patterns in _PLUGIN_PREFIX_PATTERNS.values() for p in patterns]
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _rebuild_prefix_matcher() -> None:
|
||
"""Recompile the prefix alternation and pre-screen substrings; callers read the
|
||
module globals at call time, so the swap propagates immediately."""
|
||
global _PREFIX_RE, _PREFIX_SUB_RE, _PREFIX_SUBSTRINGS
|
||
combined = _PREFIX_PATTERNS + _plugin_patterns()
|
||
_PREFIX_RE = _compile_prefix_matcher(combined)
|
||
_PREFIX_SUB_RE = _compile_prefix_sub_matcher(combined)
|
||
_PREFIX_SUBSTRINGS = tuple(_extract_literal_prefix(p) for p in combined)
|
||
|
||
|
||
# Structural validators for register_redaction_patterns, in check order:
|
||
# (predicate -> reject when True, warning message with (source, pattern) args).
|
||
_PATTERN_REJECT_RULES = (
|
||
(_has_top_level_alternation,
|
||
"%s: skipping redaction pattern %r — top-level alternation escapes the literal-prefix "
|
||
"guarantee (in 'ab|.*' the prefix binds only the first branch); wrap alternation in "
|
||
"a group after the prefix, e.g. 'ab(?:x|y)'"),
|
||
(_has_nested_unbounded_repeat,
|
||
"%s: skipping redaction pattern %r — nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. '(a+)+') can "
|
||
"backtrack catastrophically, and registered patterns run on every log line and tool output"),
|
||
(lambda pattern: len(_extract_literal_prefix(pattern)) < 2,
|
||
"%s: skipping redaction pattern %r — must start with at least 2 literal characters "
|
||
"(needed for the pre-screen substring gate)"),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def register_redaction_patterns(patterns, source: str = "plugin") -> int:
|
||
"""Additively register credential-token regexes; returns the count accepted.
|
||
|
||
Invalid entries (non-compiling, top-level alternation, nested unbounded
|
||
quantifiers, < 2 literal prefix chars) and duplicates are warned/skipped,
|
||
never raised — a broken plugin must not break startup.
|
||
"""
|
||
accepted = []
|
||
for pattern in patterns or []:
|
||
if not isinstance(pattern, str) or not pattern.strip():
|
||
logger.warning("%s: skipping empty/non-string redaction pattern", source)
|
||
continue
|
||
pattern = pattern.strip()
|
||
try:
|
||
re.compile(pattern)
|
||
except re.error as exc:
|
||
logger.warning("%s: skipping invalid redaction pattern %r (%s)", source, pattern, exc)
|
||
continue
|
||
rejected = next((message for reject, message in _PATTERN_REJECT_RULES if reject(pattern)), None)
|
||
if rejected:
|
||
logger.warning(rejected, source, pattern)
|
||
continue
|
||
if pattern in _PREFIX_PATTERNS or pattern in _plugin_patterns() or pattern in accepted:
|
||
logger.debug("%s: redaction pattern %r already registered", source, pattern)
|
||
continue
|
||
accepted.append(pattern)
|
||
|
||
if accepted:
|
||
with _registry_lock:
|
||
_PLUGIN_PREFIX_PATTERNS.setdefault(source, []).extend(accepted)
|
||
_rebuild_prefix_matcher()
|
||
logger.info("%s: registered %d redaction pattern(s)", source, len(accepted))
|
||
return len(accepted)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _reset_plugin_redaction_patterns() -> None:
|
||
"""Drop all plugin-registered patterns (tests/teardown only)."""
|
||
with _registry_lock:
|
||
_PLUGIN_PREFIX_PATTERNS.clear()
|
||
_rebuild_prefix_matcher()
|
||
|
||
|
||
class RedactingFormatter(logging.Formatter):
|
||
"""Log formatter that redacts secrets from all log messages."""
|
||
|
||
def format(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
|
||
return redact_sensitive_text(super().format(record))
|