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2 changed files with 3 additions and 51 deletions

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@ -42,26 +42,6 @@ describe('OpenCode CORS proxy rewrite', () => {
new URL('https://app.shotluma.com/api/opencode/zen/v1/models'),
)?.toString()).toBe('https://opencode.ai/zen/v1/models')
})
it('never resolves to a host other than opencode.ai, even from an adversarial path', () => {
// A literal absolute URL in the path segment would otherwise make
// `new URL(relative, base)` discard `base` and hijack the upstream host,
// carrying the forwarded Authorization/x-api-key headers to it.
expect(rewriteOpencodeProxyUrl(
new URL('https://app.shotluma.com/api/opencode/go/https://evil.example/steal'),
)).toBeNull()
expect(rewriteOpencodeProxyUrl(
new URL('https://app.shotluma.com/api/opencode/zen/https://evil.example/steal'),
)).toBeNull()
expect(rewriteOpencodeProxyUrl(
new URL('https://app.shotluma.com/api/opencode/go/http://evil.example/steal'),
)).toBeNull()
// A protocol-relative segment (`//evil.example`) must stay anchored to the
// opencode.ai origin as a path, not be interpreted as a new host.
expect(rewriteOpencodeProxyUrl(
new URL('https://app.shotluma.com/api/opencode/go//evil.example/steal'),
)?.toString()).toBe('https://opencode.ai/zen/go/evil.example/steal')
})
})
describe('OpenCode CORS proxy headers and methods', () => {
@ -128,20 +108,6 @@ describe('OpenCode CORS proxy headers and methods', () => {
))).status).toBe(404)
})
it('rejects a crafted path trying to redirect the upstream host, without forwarding the request or its credentials', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn()
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)
const response = await proxyOpencodeRequest(new Request(
'https://app.shotluma.com/api/opencode/go/https://evil.example/steal',
{ method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: 'Bearer victim-key' } },
))
expect(response.status).toBe(404)
expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
vi.unstubAllGlobals()
})
it('forwards GET and POST to the rewritten OpenCode origin', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response('ok', { status: 200 }))
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)

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@ -24,22 +24,10 @@ export const OPENCODE_FORWARDED_HEADERS = [
'x-goog-api-key',
] as const
/**
* Join a trusted upstream origin with the remainder of the incoming request
* path. The incoming path segment is attacker-controlled, so it must never
* be allowed to change the resolved origin: if it parses as an absolute or
* protocol-relative URL (e.g. a literal `https://evil.com/x` or `//evil.com`
* segment forwarded straight into `new URL(relative, base)`), the WHATWG URL
* spec lets it override `base` entirely and hijack the upstream host. Guard
* against that by re-checking the resolved origin against the expected
* upstream origin and refusing to proxy anywhere else.
*/
const joinUpstream = (origin: string, suffix: string): URL | null => {
const joinUpstream = (origin: string, suffix: string): URL => {
const base = `${origin.replace(/\/$/u, '')}/`
const relative = suffix.replace(/^\/+/u, '')
const upstream = new URL(relative, base)
if (upstream.origin !== new URL(base).origin) return null
return upstream
const relative = suffix.replace(/^\//u, '')
return new URL(relative, base)
}
/**
@ -52,13 +40,11 @@ export const rewriteOpencodeProxyUrl = (requestUrl: URL): URL | null => {
const search = requestUrl.search
if (path === GO_PREFIX || path.startsWith(`${GO_PREFIX}/`)) {
const upstream = joinUpstream(OPENCODE_GO_UPSTREAM, path.slice(GO_PREFIX.length))
if (!upstream) return null
upstream.search = search
return upstream
}
if (path === ZEN_PREFIX || path.startsWith(`${ZEN_PREFIX}/`)) {
const upstream = joinUpstream(OPENCODE_ZEN_UPSTREAM, path.slice(ZEN_PREFIX.length))
if (!upstream) return null
upstream.search = search
return upstream
}