Convert gitgram/ and aitimemachine/ from embedded git repos (which showed as opaque submodule gitlinks on GitHub) into fully-tracked first-party content. AITM now merges its 7 vendored repos as first-party engines: - memory: beads (Go task DAG) + context7 (docs SDK), unified into saved_contexts - git: vendored C git (bundled binary) + gitnexus (in-process code intelligence) - agentic: a2a (@a2a-js/sdk) + pal (AITM-managed Python subprocess) Includes the full session's product build: Gitgram web/mobile/backend features, AITM website/CLI/MCP, the unified memory layer, engine build tooling (scripts/build-engines.sh, Dockerfile, CI), docs (README, ENGINES.md, ARCHITECTURE.md), and extensive test suites. Build artifacts, node_modules, external/, and gemini-cli are gitignored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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21 lines
780 B
Plaintext
Git v2.13.7 Release Notes
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=========================
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Fixes since v2.13.6
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-------------------
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* Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file, but we
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blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our on-disk repo
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paths. This means you can do bad things by putting "../" into the
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name. We now enforce some rules for submodule names which will cause
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Git to ignore these malicious names (CVE-2018-11235).
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Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of concept from
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which the test script was adapted goes to Etienne Stalmans.
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* It was possible to trick the code that sanity-checks paths on NTFS
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into reading random piece of memory (CVE-2018-11233).
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Credit for fixing for these bugs goes to Jeff King, Johannes
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Schindelin and others.
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