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caelum0x 49b183818c Unify gitgram + aitimemachine into the monorepo (de-submodule) and merge vendored engines
Convert gitgram/ and aitimemachine/ from embedded git repos (which showed as
opaque submodule gitlinks on GitHub) into fully-tracked first-party content.

AITM now merges its 7 vendored repos as first-party engines:
- memory: beads (Go task DAG) + context7 (docs SDK), unified into saved_contexts
- git: vendored C git (bundled binary) + gitnexus (in-process code intelligence)
- agentic: a2a (@a2a-js/sdk) + pal (AITM-managed Python subprocess)

Includes the full session's product build: Gitgram web/mobile/backend features,
AITM website/CLI/MCP, the unified memory layer, engine build tooling
(scripts/build-engines.sh, Dockerfile, CI), docs (README, ENGINES.md, ARCHITECTURE.md),
and extensive test suites.

Build artifacts, node_modules, external/, and gemini-cli are gitignored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-23 14:14:09 +03:00

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Git v2.30.6 Release Notes
=========================
This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
CVE-2022-39260.
Fixes since v2.30.5
-------------------
* CVE-2022-39253:
When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
(or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
repository.
Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
"user" by default.
* CVE-2022-39260:
An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
`$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.
`git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
inputs larger than 2GiB.
Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.
Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.
Jeff King (2):
shell: add basic tests
shell: limit size of interactive commands
Kevin Backhouse (1):
alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()
Taylor Blau (11):
builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default