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caelum0x 49b183818c Unify gitgram + aitimemachine into the monorepo (de-submodule) and merge vendored engines
Convert gitgram/ and aitimemachine/ from embedded git repos (which showed as
opaque submodule gitlinks on GitHub) into fully-tracked first-party content.

AITM now merges its 7 vendored repos as first-party engines:
- memory: beads (Go task DAG) + context7 (docs SDK), unified into saved_contexts
- git: vendored C git (bundled binary) + gitnexus (in-process code intelligence)
- agentic: a2a (@a2a-js/sdk) + pal (AITM-managed Python subprocess)

Includes the full session's product build: Gitgram web/mobile/backend features,
AITM website/CLI/MCP, the unified memory layer, engine build tooling
(scripts/build-engines.sh, Dockerfile, CI), docs (README, ENGINES.md, ARCHITECTURE.md),
and extensive test suites.

Build artifacts, node_modules, external/, and gemini-cli are gitignored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-23 14:14:09 +03:00

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Git v2.30.8 Release Notes
=========================
This release addresses the security issues CVE-2023-22490 and
CVE-2023-23946.
Fixes since v2.30.7
-------------------
* CVE-2023-22490:
Using a specially-crafted repository, Git can be tricked into using
its local clone optimization even when using a non-local transport.
Though Git will abort local clones whose source $GIT_DIR/objects
directory contains symbolic links (c.f., CVE-2022-39253), the objects
directory itself may still be a symbolic link.
These two may be combined to include arbitrary files based on known
paths on the victim's filesystem within the malicious repository's
working copy, allowing for data exfiltration in a similar manner as
CVE-2022-39253.
* CVE-2023-23946:
By feeding a crafted input to "git apply", a path outside the
working tree can be overwritten as the user who is running "git
apply".
* A mismatched type in `attr.c::read_attr_from_index()` which could
cause Git to errantly reject attributes on Windows and 32-bit Linux
has been corrected.
Credit for finding CVE-2023-22490 goes to yvvdwf, and the fix was
developed by Taylor Blau, with additional help from others on the
Git security mailing list.
Credit for finding CVE-2023-23946 goes to Joern Schneeweisz, and the
fix was developed by Patrick Steinhardt.
Johannes Schindelin (1):
attr: adjust a mismatched data type
Patrick Steinhardt (1):
apply: fix writing behind newly created symbolic links
Taylor Blau (3):
t5619: demonstrate clone_local() with ambiguous transport
clone: delay picking a transport until after get_repo_path()
dir-iterator: prevent top-level symlinks without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS