caelum0x b011dce423 test+config: connector test suite + service config/docs (manifest files)
Connectors: 22 real pytest modules (186 pass / 7 optional-dep skips) exercising
every connector's dependency-free surface + missing-driver degradation; SSRF
guard verified; errors_connector.py as a thin re-export (no forked taxonomy).
Services: config/{dev,staging,prod,test,limits,logging}.yaml + docs/*.md for
api/gateway/scheduler/worker, mapped to the real config structs; gateway/scheduler
Dockerfiles + scheduler .env/README. All YAML validated.

Closes 66 manifest files (gap 175->109). No source behavior changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 19:23:14 +03:00

2.6 KiB

Security boundary

lawsynth-gateway is the public entry point. It is the layer that faces untrusted clients; the lawsynth-api application it wraps is not intended to be internet-exposed on its own. The gateway's job is admission and canonicalization, not authentication — the API still enforces bearer auth, tenant isolation, and idempotency behind it.

Trust boundary

untrusted client ──▶ TLS terminator / edge ──▶ [ gateway ─▶ API ] (one process)
  • The gateway admits or rejects the request and cleans it.
  • The API authenticates the bearer token, scopes the caller to a tenant, and performs the operation.
  • The API socket must never be published directly; only the gateway (behind TLS) should receive external traffic.

What the gateway enforces

  • Path and method safety. Absolute, normalized paths only (rejecting control characters, \, and ./..); a fixed method allowlist; routing limited to api_prefix, /healthz, /readyz.
  • Header hygiene. Canonical header names, rejection of invalid values and duplicates, and stripping of hop-by-hop headers and client-supplied forwarding headers (X-Forwarded-*, Forwarded, X-Real-IP) so a caller cannot spoof its origin or the logged client identity. The gateway sets X-Forwarded-For/-Proto itself.
  • Resource bounds. Body, header count, and header byte ceilings; rejection of chunked/transformed bodies; a bounded, LRU-capped sliding-window rate limit.
  • Exact-origin CORS. Only origins in the allowlist are permitted; preflight is validated, not reflected blindly.
  • Response defense. Fixed safe headers, an authoritative X-Request-Id a backend cannot override, recomputed Content-Length, and conversion of any malformed backend response into 502 rather than leaking it.

What the gateway does not do

  • No authentication or authorization. It does not read or validate bearer tokens; that is the API's responsibility. It passes Authorization through untouched and never logs it.
  • No TLS. It speaks plain HTTP; terminate TLS at an upstream edge/proxy.
  • No remote upstream. Proxying to a remote API, retries, and circuit-breaking are unavailable by design (RemoteUpstreamUnavailable); use an audited edge proxy if they are required.

Deployment guidance

Terminate TLS upstream, run the gateway+API as a single non-root process, keep the API unreachable except through the gateway, and configure allowed_origins to the minimal exact set. Rate-limit and body ceilings should match the API's own limits so the two boundaries agree.