Connectors: 22 real pytest modules (186 pass / 7 optional-dep skips) exercising
every connector's dependency-free surface + missing-driver degradation; SSRF
guard verified; errors_connector.py as a thin re-export (no forked taxonomy).
Services: config/{dev,staging,prod,test,limits,logging}.yaml + docs/*.md for
api/gateway/scheduler/worker, mapped to the real config structs; gateway/scheduler
Dockerfiles + scheduler .env/README. All YAML validated.
Closes 66 manifest files (gap 175->109). No source behavior changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.6 KiB
2.6 KiB
Security boundary
lawsynth-gateway is the public entry point. It is the layer that faces
untrusted clients; the lawsynth-api application it wraps is not intended to be
internet-exposed on its own. The gateway's job is admission and canonicalization,
not authentication — the API still enforces bearer auth, tenant isolation, and
idempotency behind it.
Trust boundary
untrusted client ──▶ TLS terminator / edge ──▶ [ gateway ─▶ API ] (one process)
- The gateway admits or rejects the request and cleans it.
- The API authenticates the bearer token, scopes the caller to a tenant, and performs the operation.
- The API socket must never be published directly; only the gateway (behind TLS) should receive external traffic.
What the gateway enforces
- Path and method safety. Absolute, normalized paths only (rejecting
control characters,
\, and./..); a fixed method allowlist; routing limited toapi_prefix,/healthz,/readyz. - Header hygiene. Canonical header names, rejection of invalid values and
duplicates, and stripping of hop-by-hop headers and client-supplied
forwarding headers (
X-Forwarded-*,Forwarded,X-Real-IP) so a caller cannot spoof its origin or the logged client identity. The gateway setsX-Forwarded-For/-Protoitself. - Resource bounds. Body, header count, and header byte ceilings; rejection of chunked/transformed bodies; a bounded, LRU-capped sliding-window rate limit.
- Exact-origin CORS. Only origins in the allowlist are permitted; preflight is validated, not reflected blindly.
- Response defense. Fixed safe headers, an authoritative
X-Request-Ida backend cannot override, recomputedContent-Length, and conversion of any malformed backend response into502rather than leaking it.
What the gateway does not do
- No authentication or authorization. It does not read or validate bearer
tokens; that is the API's responsibility. It passes
Authorizationthrough untouched and never logs it. - No TLS. It speaks plain HTTP; terminate TLS at an upstream edge/proxy.
- No remote upstream. Proxying to a remote API, retries, and circuit-breaking
are unavailable by design (
RemoteUpstreamUnavailable); use an audited edge proxy if they are required.
Deployment guidance
Terminate TLS upstream, run the gateway+API as a single non-root process, keep
the API unreachable except through the gateway, and configure allowed_origins
to the minimal exact set. Rate-limit and body ceilings should match the API's own
limits so the two boundaries agree.