Connectors: 22 real pytest modules (186 pass / 7 optional-dep skips) exercising
every connector's dependency-free surface + missing-driver degradation; SSRF
guard verified; errors_connector.py as a thin re-export (no forked taxonomy).
Services: config/{dev,staging,prod,test,limits,logging}.yaml + docs/*.md for
api/gateway/scheduler/worker, mapped to the real config structs; gateway/scheduler
Dockerfiles + scheduler .env/README. All YAML validated.
Closes 66 manifest files (gap 175->109). No source behavior changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.4 KiB
2.4 KiB
Security boundary
lawsynth-api is the authenticated HTTP boundary in front of the local domain
core. It authenticates callers, isolates tenants, bounds every request, and
serializes responses defensively. It is not a multi-tenant identity provider.
What the process does
- Bearer authentication. Tokens are compared in constant time
(
hmac.compare_digest) against the grant map inLAWSYNTH_API_TOKENS_JSON. Each token resolves to oneorganization_idand a scope set. - Tenant isolation. Every domain operation is scoped to the principal's
organization_id; a caller for tenant A can never read or mutate tenant B's projects, runs, artifacts, or events. Event streams are partitioned by the same scope. - Scope enforcement. Reads require
read, mutations requirewrite,adminimplies both. Writes additionally require anIdempotency-Key. - Admission limits. Method allowlist, absolute/normalized path checks
(rejecting
./../NUL/backslash), header line-break rejection, a bounded query (max 32 params, no duplicates),application/json-only bodies, and amax_request_bytesceiling. - Defensive responses. Fixed safe headers on every response
(
Cache-Control: no-store,X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,X-Api-Version), a validatedContent-Length, and JSON serialized withallow_nan=False. Error bodies never include stack traces or secrets.
What the process does not do
- No transport encryption. The stdlib server is loopback-only; a deployment must terminate TLS at the gateway or reverse proxy. Do not expose the WSGI socket directly to the internet.
- No external identity. OAuth/OIDC verification is deliberately out of scope
(
lawsynth_server/auth.py); it belongs to a deployment-specific identity adapter. This process only verifies pre-provisioned local bearer tokens. - No distributed guarantees. Repositories are process-local; the API does not
claim distributed metadata, shared idempotency, or remote worker execution.
/v1/worker/*is an honest501, and a missing native runtime is an honest503 native_unavailable.
Deployment guidance
Run as the dedicated non-root user that owns the database and object root, put
the audited gateway (and TLS) in front, and keep LAWSYNTH_API_TOKENS_JSON in a
secret manager — never in config/ or .env.example. Rotate any token that may
have been exposed by replacing the grant map and restarting.