Connectors: 22 real pytest modules (186 pass / 7 optional-dep skips) exercising
every connector's dependency-free surface + missing-driver degradation; SSRF
guard verified; errors_connector.py as a thin re-export (no forked taxonomy).
Services: config/{dev,staging,prod,test,limits,logging}.yaml + docs/*.md for
api/gateway/scheduler/worker, mapped to the real config structs; gateway/scheduler
Dockerfiles + scheduler .env/README. All YAML validated.
Closes 66 manifest files (gap 175->109). No source behavior changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
46 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
46 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security boundary
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`lawsynth-api` is the authenticated HTTP boundary in front of the local domain
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core. It authenticates callers, isolates tenants, bounds every request, and
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serializes responses defensively. It is not a multi-tenant identity provider.
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## What the process does
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- **Bearer authentication.** Tokens are compared in constant time
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(`hmac.compare_digest`) against the grant map in `LAWSYNTH_API_TOKENS_JSON`.
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Each token resolves to one `organization_id` and a scope set.
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- **Tenant isolation.** Every domain operation is scoped to the principal's
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`organization_id`; a caller for tenant A can never read or mutate tenant B's
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projects, runs, artifacts, or events. Event streams are partitioned by the same
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scope.
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- **Scope enforcement.** Reads require `read`, mutations require `write`, `admin`
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implies both. Writes additionally require an `Idempotency-Key`.
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- **Admission limits.** Method allowlist, absolute/normalized path checks
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(rejecting `.`/`..`/NUL/backslash), header line-break rejection, a bounded
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query (max 32 params, no duplicates), `application/json`-only bodies, and a
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`max_request_bytes` ceiling.
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- **Defensive responses.** Fixed safe headers on every response
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(`Cache-Control: no-store`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`,
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`X-Api-Version`), a validated `Content-Length`, and JSON serialized with
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`allow_nan=False`. Error bodies never include stack traces or secrets.
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## What the process does not do
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- **No transport encryption.** The stdlib server is loopback-only; a deployment
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must terminate TLS at the gateway or reverse proxy. Do not expose the WSGI
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socket directly to the internet.
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- **No external identity.** OAuth/OIDC verification is deliberately out of scope
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(`lawsynth_server/auth.py`); it belongs to a deployment-specific identity
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adapter. This process only verifies pre-provisioned local bearer tokens.
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- **No distributed guarantees.** Repositories are process-local; the API does not
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claim distributed metadata, shared idempotency, or remote worker execution.
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`/v1/worker/*` is an honest `501`, and a missing native runtime is an honest
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`503 native_unavailable`.
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## Deployment guidance
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Run as the dedicated non-root user that owns the database and object root, put
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the audited gateway (and TLS) in front, and keep `LAWSYNTH_API_TOKENS_JSON` in a
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secret manager — never in `config/` or `.env.example`. Rotate any token that may
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have been exposed by replacing the grant map and restarting.
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